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MARGINS
Slow Progress
The 1992 federal Budget continues 
the staggered economic stimulus 
begun with the Hawke jobs state­
ment in November 1991. The 
November statement, One Nation, 
and the July youth announcement 
together provided for around $2.4 
billion in 1992-93 towards reducing 
unemployment. The Budget adds 
another $740 million in 1992/3 and 
a lesser amount for the following 
year. Yet in each case the economic 
statements have been more modest 
than necessary and have come too 
late to achieve their maximum ef­
fect. The job creation should have 
started in early 1991 and should 
have been of the order of $2 billion. 
If it had the recovery would have 
been in full swing by now.
The budget was accompanied by the 
usual public venting of myths con­
cerning the dangerous size of the 
budget deficit, the effects on private 
investment of borrowing to finance 
the deficit, and the damage sup­
posedly about to be inflicted by the 
amorphous international money 
markets were the deficit to be too 
high.
Yet the Budget stimulus represents a 
modest 1.1% of Gross Domestic 
Product in 1992/3. (It has also been 
carefully designed to taper away 
after that time; clearly the govern­
ment has learnt a lesson from the 
1983 recession, when spending was 
not reduced quickly enough, and the 
ground was laid for the current ac­
count disaster, the interest rate 
squeeze and ultimately this reces­
sion.) To those media pundits who 
trumpet that we are 'throwing 
money at the problem', as though 
this were a wastrel act, this writer 
would reply that this is exactly what 
demand-deficient unemployment 
requires — in this case, given the 
severity of the downturn, the 
stimulus could have been twice as 
big. Indeed, despite the media 
breastbeating, the post-Budget reac­
tion from the international money 
markets has been zero. The budget 
and its 'Keynesian' stimulus have 
passed the market test.
The previous stimulatory state­
ments emphasised training; the 
Budget targeted jobs instead. This 
reflects an abandonment of the long- 
held notion in policy circles that the 
unemployment problem is 
predominantly structural. The fact is 
that the main cause of the unemploy­
ment problem is deficient demand, 
and it will only be cured if spending 
increases. Further, it doesn't really 
matter what type of jobs are created 
because the exercise is about restor­
ing the spending power of the un­
employed. The fact that local 
councils will utilise the funds to ful­
fil socially useful projects is a bonus.
It also doesn't matter that the spend­
ing is finite. Dr Hewson warns that 
when the money runs out so will the 
jobs. That is true, and desirable, be­
cause by that time the economy will 
be moving again and absorbing the 
available workforce. Emergency job 
creation does not aim to generate 
permanent jobs. It merely aims to 
prime the spending stream in order 
to underwrite permanent employ­
ment elsewhere in the economy.
Taxation seems to have dominated 
the post-Budget analysis—and here 
the real drama has surrounded the 
spectre of future 'hidden' taxes. To 
cover the possibility that the Budget 
deficit will not recover enough to 
return to surplus by 1995/6, the 
government unexpectedly 
foreshadowed the possibility of new 
taxes at that time. As a political move 
this prophecy was fraught with 
danger. But in terms of responsible 
fiscal conduct the likelihood that 
taxation might occasionally have to
be increased to accommodate 
changed fiscal conditions is uncon- 
troversial. One of the biggest costs of 
the 'rationalist' legacy of the last 
decade was the widespread accep­
tance of the belief that taxes can only 
move downwards. The damage 
caused by our reliance on monetary 
policy in the late 80s to control the 
current account deficit is a reflection 
of the imbalance that has crept into 
the policy debate.
Fiscal and monetary policy both 
have a role to play. A discretionary 
fiscal deficit is perfectly appropriate 
when unemployment is high and 
economic activity is low. In these 
times public spending and/or tax 
cuts are desirable. But as the 
economy gains momentum the 
deficit should be curbed by spend­
ing cuts and/or tax increases. To 
constrain fiscal conduct by imposing 
the condition that taxes can only fall 
is myopic and irresponsible, and 
misunderstands the role of fiscal 
stimulus. The tax cut promise in One 
Nation was a case in point.
The one real worry about the Budget 
is that the dilemma of stop-go 
growth has not entirely been solved. 
Since 1983 reform has been occur­
ring in our internationally competi­
tive sectors. Exports of 
manufactures have grown much 
faster than those for primary com­
modities—albeit from a very low 
base. But it is unlikely that this 
growth in our export or import- 
competing potential has provided 
enough room for sustained growth 
to mop up unemployment. The ex­
pected low levels of activity in the 
world economy will only exacerbate 
this. Recovery requires invest­
ment—which increases our imports. 
And the growth rate necessary to 
provide sustained and significant 
reductions in unemployment still 
seems unsustainable in terms of our 
current account deficit. More needs 
to be done, and short-term import 
controls, for example, are worth con­
sidering—particularly in the luxury 
consumption goods area.
B IL L  M ITC H E LL  teach es in the 
Em ploym ent Studies Centre at the 
University of Newcastle.
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PROFILE
Stuart Littlemore
There are two schools of thought 
about Stuart Littlemore. One is that 
he is a pompous git. The other is 
that he may be a pompous git, but 
at least he's our pompous git. Even 
if you don't like his style, according 
to adherents of the second theory, 
you can't deny that he stands up for 
the right things in the media: ac­
curacy, sensitivity on issues of race 
and privacy, a bias against sen­
sationalism, and opposition to the 
concentration of ownership.
Well, up to a point. But in fact 
Littlemore's paternalistic style is in­
trinsic to his point of view. His belief 
in Quality with a capital 'Q' leads 
inevitably to the assumption that it's 
perfectly possible, indeed necessary, 
to make value judgements about 
what is and what is not 'quality7. 
That's a perfectly defensible posi­
tion. What isn't defensible is for 
those judgements to be raised to the 
level of objective fact. Everyone's en­
titled to their opinion, but in this case 
it seems that some are more entitled 
than others.
Littlemore appears to be 'our' pom­
pous git only to people who agree 
with his definition of quality— 
which most people in white middle- 
class, Left-liberal circles probably do. 
It's a thoroughly elitist doctrine, be­
cause it implies not merely that 
'quality' is superior to 'trash', but 
that people who watch 'trash' (that is 
the vast majority of the population) 
are morons. That may not seem like
an unreasonable assumption when 
the program under discussion is 
something you don't care for your­
self—say Hinch. But Littlemore's 
partiality becomes much more ob­
vious when he ridicules something 
you yourself enjoy. Sport was the real 
eye-opener for me. He obviously 
despises it. What's more, he profes­
ses not to be able to tell the difference 
between a rugby league State of 
Origin commentary by HG Nelson 
and the genuine Channel Nine ar­
ticle. If this is true it betrays an awe­
inspiring absence of humour; if not, 
an extraordinary capacity for disin­
genuous snobbery. I suspect both.
For people who share Littlemore's 
views on sport, perhaps the easiest 
way to avoid being seduced by his 
illusion of objectivity is to imagine 
his reaction to your favorite 
'downmarket' American comedy. I 
find The Simpsons and Cheers par­
ticularly helpful in this respect. Bet­
ter still is to place him actually in the 
bar at Cheers. Does the lip curl with 
distaste? I think so. It's a salutary 
experience to find that contempt 
directed at you, rather than some 
hapless sub-editor on a provincial 
newspaper who can't spell the name 
of the prime minister.
The problem with Mediawatch isn't 
just that Littlemore demands a 
shared set of values. It's also that too 
often he fails to put into practice the
sceptical approach demanded of 
others, particularly when it comes to 
people and projects which he instinc­
tively feels he should be in sympathy 
with. Three examples come to mind. 
The first was the spectacle of Lit­
tlemore and that other thoroughly 
civilised critic John Mortimer dis­
cussing the virtues of 'quality British 
TV' (ie Rumpole) as though it were 
fine wine or classical music. The 
second is his uncritical (even cring­
ing) attitude to foreign publications 
such as the New Yorker and the Sun­
day Times. (The latter hasn't been a 
quality paper in the sense that Lit­
tlemore imagines for at least ten 
years.) The third was a more recent 
feature on the remote communities 
satellite TV service, Imparja. By most 
accounts (Michael Meadows in ALR 
134, for example), Imparja has been 
by no means an unqualified success. 
Yet Littlemore's trip to the Alice 
produced nothing more than a puff 
for what he evidently saw as a good 
cause, rather than a story.
It's a pity that the show demands 
such a conformist and essentially 
ABC-centred view from its audience, 
since many of its more detailed 
criticisms of the media are valid and 
important. The observation that a 
reporter from one of the commercial 
stations kitted himself out in a 
paramilitary-style jacket to report a 
car chase incident was a recent case 
in point.
But the value of such comment is 
vitiated by Littlemore's acerbic (and 
too often downright petty) high­
mindedness—a state which leaves 
no room for self-deprecation, or in­
deed any acknowledgement that he 
himself is part of the media. He 
presents the case against shoddy 
journalism like the barrister he is. 
What he is after is not so much an 
understanding of the media as a con­
viction. The presentation of the 
evidence may be cogent enough, and 
highly entertaining, but the overall 
effect is dulled by the knowledge 
that, when it comes to judging 
quality, it's Littlemore himself who 
makes the laws.
MIKE TICHER is not part of the media. 
Rather, he is ALR's business manager.
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LETTER
FROM
SARAJEVO
A Shot in Sarajevo
In one year in former Yugoslavia, 28 
journalists have been killed—more 
than during the whole period of 
American involvement in Vietnam. 
A French journalist, Jean Hatzfeld, 
and I almost became numbers 29 
and 30.
Jean—who works for the French Left- 
leaning daily Liberation—was driv­
ing as we sped down the road to 
Sarajevo airport. Two cracks rang 
out, followed by the sound of 
splintering metal. A third shot hit me 
in my left side, but the impact was so 
slight that I thought it was a mere 
flesh wound, and was distracted by 
the sight of Jean's right leg exploding 
under the impact of the first two bul­
lets. Up to 15 more rounds hit the car 
as I tried to steer us towards the cover 
of some garages on the left, over 
which I thought the shots had come.
With shots still ringing out, I flung 
open my door and ran around to 
Jean, lifting him out of the car and 
into the ditch that ran parallel to the 
road. Deep red blood was 
everywhere. "Save my leg please," he 
pleaded. "I want to play football 
again."
the Bosnian Territorial Defence; I 
suspect it was they who accidentally 
shot us, taking us for Serb Chetniks, 
who frequently use that road, 
masquerading as journalists.
I arrived at the Kosevo hospital in 
Sarajevo in a private car about 20 
minutes after we had been shot, to 
find Jean had only just arrived. Am­
bulances are prime targets for Chet- 
nik snipers, so they are few on the 
ground and their journeys are haz­
ardous and slow. After a two-hour 
operation on Jean's leg, I was told 
that it had been completely shattered 
and there was a chance he would lose 
it below the knee. Still under the 
misapprehension that I had escaped 
virtually unscathed, I returned to my 
hotel. In fact, I had a bullet lodged in 
my pelvis and, after an agonising and 
sleepless night, made worse by the 
constant shelling around my hotel, I 
was rushed into hospital the next 
morning.
I remained in hospital for four days, 
during which time I was unable to 
sleep because of the pain, although 
the medical staff worked wonders 
with what equipment they had. The 
nurses and doctors are on 24-hour 
shifts in groups of eight for each 
department. During the two months 
of the war the traumatology depart­
ment alone has seen 3,500 patients. 
More than 100 were admitted in less 
than an hour on 21 June, when a shell 
landed on a bank in the main street in 
Sarajevo, killing 20 pensioners who 
were queueing up for their pensions, 
and wounding many others. Profes­
sor Vranich, the head of traumatol­
ogy, says 90% of the casualties have 
been civilians caught in the indis­
criminate shelling and sniper fire 
from the Serbs. Even at the hospital, 
they are not safe. The staff there have 
no shortage of horror stories—the 
surgeon shot by a sniper while per­
forming an operation; the old man 
admitted with his lower arm shot off 
who, 12 hours later, had the rest of it 
shot off by another sniper as he lay in 
his hospital bed.
There was much confusion, but even­
tually a stretcher was found and Jean 
was carried off to an ambulance. My 
wounds were dressed by soldiers of
In the bed next to me was another old 
man, aged 74, who had been one of 
2,000 civilians imprisoned in Kovla, 
a former open prison for traffic and
other minor offenders, near Sarajevo 
airport. He had been tortured until 
every bone in his fragile body was 
broken. He was finally released in an 
exchange of prisoners. The Serbs 
never release Bosnian fighters, he 
said, only women, children and the 
elderly, in exchange for their own 
fighters.
In the bed opposite, meanwhile, 
Davor, a young boy of 26, told me he 
had received a tank grenade in the leg 
while rescuing a friend in the largely 
Muslim district of Dobrinja, next to 
the airport. Originally, it had a 
population of 50,000, but when the 
Serb population fled, 30,000 Muslims 
remained. Besieged since the begin­
ning of the war, it has been constantly 
shelled. Until the recent arrival of UN 
relief supplies, its residents had been 
surviving by eating grass and 
pigeons.
Four days before I was shot, a 
Spanish journalist and I had been 
driven into Dobrinja under heavy 
sniper fire. When we arrived in 
Dobrinja, we were shown the tiny 
'hospital' consisting of 20 or 30 sleep­
ing bags in two basement cellars, run 
by one doctor, Dr Smojek. By chance, 
he had been staying in the district 
with his two children after escaping 
the Serb destruction of his hometown 
of Vitegrad, where his wife was still 
trapped. He had been working round 
the clock and hadn't seen his children 
for 20 days, nor had any news of his 
wife for a month. A local pharmacy 
in Dobrinja had been the sole source 
of all the medical provisions for this 
hospital for two months.
A Serb, Bosko Reljic, who had left 
part of Serbian-controlled Dobrinja 
with his Muslim wife and daughter, 
told me: "The Chetniks came to our 
block and asked if we had any Mus­
lims. The second day they returned 
and searched and looted every 
suspected Muslim apartment. The 
final straw came on the third day 
when an old Muslim man's daughter 
was taken at gunpoint and the old 
man was told to bring a handful of 
gold jewellery to the Chetniks the 
next day or his daughter would die. 
Everyone in the block rallied round
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and enough gold was collected to 
save the girl."
Sarajevo's spirit of integration— 
Muslims, Serbs and Croats have 
lived harmoniously as neighbours 
for years, and intermarriage is com­
monplace—has galled the Serbian 
Chetnik fighters, and partly explains 
their relentless pounding of the city. 
This often extends to Sarajevo Serbs, 
too. I even met one Serbian woman 
whose husband had left to join the 
Chetniks to head their communica­
tions network at the beginning of the 
war. She had heard nothing of him 
since, despite making an impas­
sioned plea on TV. Instead, her 
broadcast resulted in shelling being 
directed by Chetnik forces at her 
apartment block.
While I was in Dobrinja, the Chet­
niks captured part of the district and 
began 'cleansing' it of Muslims. In 
one incident, this meant cutting the 
throats of most of the men in front of 
their wives and children, and then 
leading the women, and the small 
number of surviving men, to a 
bridge that had been mined. There 
they were made to collect the dead 
Chetniks around it, before being told 
that they were free to run across the 
ruined bridge—and its mines—to 
freedom.
After I left Dobrinja, I spoke to a 
young Muslim man (D) and his 
Croat wife (J) who had undergone 
this barbaric treatment. They did not 
want their identities revealed for 
fear of reprisals. D told me: "There 
were 40 of us in our group. As soon 
as we started running, they began to 
shoot at us with machine guns. I saw 
a pregnant woman with a child fall 
in front of me—I don't know what 
happened to the child. We all ran 
into a ditch but they shouted at us to 
get out or they would hand grenade 
us. So we came out and they began 
shooting us again. So we dived into 
the opposite ditch and began crawl­
ing the 450 metres to the other end."
"We crawled over the rotting 
corpses of three Chetniks," J con­
tinued, "and after about two hours 
we reached the other end of the 
ditch, but we still didn't know where
we were. They had said the TV 
cameras would be waiting for us, but 
there was no sign of them." D picked 
up the story. "After three hours 
crouching in terror, one woman, 
whose husband had been murdered 
in front of her, finally crawled out 
and ran towards some buildings. 
The Chetniks shot at her, but missed 
and one by one we all followed her 
to safety. Out of 40 who started, only 
26 of us made it." There are stories in 
Dobrinja of Chetniks being found 
with documents on them saying 
they are a superior race descended 
from the inhabitants of the lost con­
tinent of Atlantis, which will soon 
rise to the surface and join with the 
Serbs in battle. Apocryphal or not, 
the stories fit easily with the be­
haviour of the besiegers of Dobrinja.
I was trapped in Dobrinja for a fur­
ther two days because of the ferocity 
of the shelling. The previous day, a 
journalist from Associated Press had 
gone out in a convoy and his driver 
had been hit in the leg, while the two 
ambulances in front had been shot to 
pieces, killing four medics and two 
patients.
So, finally, we were forced to escape 
under cover of darkness. There were 
about 50 of us, some carrying 50kg 
packs and bazookas. At precisely 
11.10 pm we left the shopping arcade 
which was being used as a bunker 
and silently crept into the deserted 
streets, towards the periphery of 
Dobrinja.
We had gone about 400 metres when 
a Chetnik machine gun, positioned 
on the hill above the road we had to 
cross to get into the hills, opened up 
with a terrifying burst that was 
returned by some Bosnian snipers. 
Tracer bullets flashed everywhere 
and a couple of green flares went up 
illuminating the ghostly scene. The 
hills that ring Sarajevo amplified the 
sounds of shelling and gunfire, 
while the echoes made it impossible 
to tell where the gunfire was coming 
from, or who was shooting at whom.
After a consultation, the Bosnian for­
ces returned to the bunker. We 
would wait for an hour for the Chet­
niks to get thoroughly drunk, as is 
their wont, they said. At midnight, 
we crossed the road three streets fur­
ther down. It seemed they were right 
about the Chetniks: we crossed into 
the hills without a single shot being 
fired. I didn't know then that, having 
escaped Dobrinja, I would be cut 
down by a bullet on the road to the 
airport.
It has been remarked that it took just 
one bullet, the one that killed 
Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 
1914, to start the first world war, but 
it has taken a million bullets before 
the EC or UN will even consider 
military intervention in this one. Is it 
simply because there's no oil in 
former Yugoslavia?
K E V IN  W EA V ER w rite s  fo r  New 
Statesman and Society, where a longer 
version of this piece was originally 
published.
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MOVEABLE 
FEAST
Thirtynothing
Somehow it seems fitting to turn 30 
in Canberra. It's not the town one 
would choose to turn 18 or 21 in. 
Such occasions mark a triumphant 
assertion of adulthood which only 
makes sense when one takes youth 
for granted. They are about fun, full 
undeniable fun. They require cities 
dedicated to pleasure, or at least 
where one can get properly intoxi­
cated, drive down freeways ab­
solutely ripped and lose oneself in 
a vibrant crowd. But 30 is to 21 what 
superannuation is to any notion of 
anarchy.
30 marks the end of youth with an 
unarguable whimper. Government 
deems that youth ends at 26. But 26 
really blends into the middle 20s 
quite unobtrusively. I thought I was 
25 or so until I suddenly saw the 
three in 30 reaching out like a fist 
punching me. Or perhaps the three 
denotes the embryonic lines at the 
corners of my eyes, like the wings of 
the crow whose feet may soon caress 
the skin there.
The rituals of ageing have taken on 
a new rigour since the big three-oh 
loomed like a wrinkly unwelcome 
siren calling me towards the rocks of 
senility. What used to be a random 
purchase of moisturiser and miracle 
tonics has become more calculated. I
wrinkle my brow considering which 
is the most effective de-wrinkler ad­
vertised among the flawless skins of 
the 18year-olds in Vogue. Exercise is 
approached as a necessity, not as a 
joy.
Now some readers may well be mut­
tering about patriarchal oppression 
and the commodification of the 
female body, and the inability of 
women to display their (our) age 
openly in this society. Apart from 
pointing out to such readers that 
muttering causes unattractive lines 
around the mouth (not unlike the 
pursed vertical lines detectable on 
smokers' skin) I would simply say 
that the intellectual explanation of 
anxiety bears very little relation to 
the lived experience of same. You 
can't wish away the desire to stay 
young, or dissolve inequality like a 
nasty stain with the Omo of feminist 
awareness. There's no neutral 
ground one can take up in terms of 
age. You either revel in it or deny it, 
or try to develop a way of embracing 
it stylishly, without looking 
desperate.
But let us leave the surgical strike of 
Toorak for the spreading hips of 
Canberra. Many would applaud the 
fact that there are very few images of 
women on billboards in the ACT. 
Advertising is all but absent. So, un­
fortunately, is any notion of the life 
of the body as a cause of celebration 
in itself. People who accept 
Canberra's elevation of work above 
pleasure, tend to spread into their 
offices, to leave off concern about 
their physical life.
The fatness of the ACT tends to be a 
complacent stodgy fatness, rather 
than a revelling excessive fatness. It 
is mirrored by the obsessive jogging 
thinness of other public servants 
who slot exercise in as part of a busy 
day, to keep the body machine 
functioning smoothly. Respectable 
Canberra is the most body-hating 
place in Australia (how this ties in— 
or up—with the X-rated video in­
dustry is a question worthy of 
further study). It is perhaps because 
of my desire to define myself against 
the comfortable fat of Canberra that 
I enter my 30s 30 kilos lighter than I 
was at 28. Breasts, it seems are back.
I will never forget the comment of a 
50 (or so) year-old woman in the 
waiting room of a plastic surgeon in 
Toorak, where I, at 26, found myself 
having a small blemish removed 
from my back. She ran her eyes over 
my face, and down my body before 
returning to the aforementioned 
magazine in its French edition. After 
flicking through a few pages she 
turned to her equally pinched face 
friend and said "Breasts seem to be 
back. I'll have to get them done 
next." The "them" made my flesh 
crawl then, as now, at the idea of 
going under the knife for aesthetic 
purposes. And yet, what is an aes­
thetic purpose? A culture that draws 
a line between the intellect and the 
body and places women on the side 
of the carnal makes such an industry 
all but inevitable.
And when I move back to Mel­
bourne, a place where one can live 
on good food, get a good massage of 
the decent variety and sit in a cafe 
where people care how they look 
(men and women both), then per­
haps I'll find my youth hidden in the 
coffee, rising like steam from the 
cup, flexing muscles and wit. 
Canberra's anti-body, anti-pleasure 
ethos has made Melbourne seem like 
the epitome of indulgence, a lady 
lying back on an embroidered 
cushion of desire. And, if I examine 
her closely, perhaps she isn't so 
young, but just given over to 
pleasure and the quest for sensation, 
rather than the creation of policy, 
paper and permanence.
Penelope Cottier.
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Withering of the Clans
Following the persistent and grim television pictures 
of starvation in Somalia, the industrialised world has 
rediscovered its charitable soul. The United Nations, 
the European Community, the US and the other 
developed nations have decided to provide relief 
assistance before the entire Somali community 
perishes. Australia has offered $3.5 million towards 
the effort. Some critics have understandably blamed 
the international community for acting too late.
The Somali tragedy has been apparent 
for several years, but the UN and the 
developed world did not pay much 
attention to it  Earlier in 1992 the UN 
was involved in a ceasefire arranged 
between the warring Somali factions. 
UN secretary-general Dr Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, who has a longstand­
ing interest in the Horn of Africa, 
despatched UN assistant secretary- 
general James Jonah to Somalia in 
January to try to persuade the warring 
factions to negotiate. In the same
month the UN Security Council ap­
proved a resolution imposing an arms 
embargo on Somalia and calling on 
the combatants to permit 
humanitarian assistance to reach 
those most in need.
The warring factions did in fact accept 
a ceasefire in New York in February, 
but they immediately flouted it—as 
they had done other ceasefires. 
Prophetically James Jonah warned the 
various factions of the United Somali 
Congress (USC) in early March that
the international community had 
tired of their ceasefire violations, and 
that Somalia might be abandoned al­
together. By the end of March the 
Somali tragedy had been put on the 
backburner by the UN—largely be­
cause the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council (and especially 
the US, UK and France) were more 
interested in the equally serious crisis 
in the Balkans.
It has been estimated that between 
November 1991 and August 1992 
more than 100,000 Somalis lost their 
lives either in the civil war or through 
starvation. If the international com­
munity had intervened nine months 
earlier many lives would have been 
saved and some major problems 
would have been alleviated. The 
trouble with the current gesture is not 
just that it is too late; it is also too little, 
and fails to address the root of the 
problem.
The UN has decided to send 500 
troops to escort food convoys in the 
capital Mogadishu, where at least 200 
people die of starvation every day. But 
even James Jonah admits that such a 
force is too small to be of any use 
outside Mogadishu. If the UN were 
serious about sending food to the 
starving people outside Mogadishu it 
would send not less than 15,000 troops 
to escort food trucks through the anar­
chic conditions of Somalia.
However, starvation in Somalia is just 
one symptom of the tragedy. In fact, it 
is a consequence of the civil war, and 
the civil war itself is a result of clan 
feuds and power struggles. For 
generations the single most important 
factor in Somali society has been the 
clan. Although all Somalis belong to 
one ethnic group and enjoy a sense of 
common identity based on a shared 
culture, clan loyalty often undermines 
the sense of shared nationhood.
It was clan feuds which brought down 
the government of former dictator 
General Mohammed Siad Barre in 
January 1991. The octogenarian Barre, 
who had ruled Somalia with an iron 
fist since coming to power in 1969, had 
sought to transform  Somali 
nationalism from its old segmentary 
state to a modern 'organic' mode. In
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the process he banned clanism, and in 
the early 70s prohibited any reference 
to clans. He adopted the doctrine of 
'scientific socialism' in an effort to 
unite the nation, but in practice 
lineage has continued to determine 
the course of Som alia's political 
development.
Clan and lineage affiliations are also 
vital in obtaining jobs, services and 
favours. Som alia's social and 
economic development, as well as 
political organisation, has traditional­
ly stemmed from lineage systems 
based on one or other of the six major 
clan families— Darod, Digil, Dir, 
Hawiye, Issaq and Rahawein. TTie six 
family groups are further split into 
small clans and lineages; the Hawiye 
clan, for instance, has six sub-clans, 
two of which are sharply divided.
The carnage, chaos and sheer mad­
ness of the past few years stems from 
this structure of Somali society. By the 
time Barre was toppled in January
1991 the country had been sliding 
toward anarchy for more than three 
years. Barre had maintained a 
centralised and authoritarian regime 
that had literally ruined the country. 
The economy was in a shambles, 
political institutions had collapsed, 
corruption was rampant, morale in 
the civil and armed forces was low 
and clanism was very strong. The
situation was so appalling that few 
people had any illusions that Barre's 
fall from grace would bring an imme­
diate end to the suffering or restore 
normal services.
Moreover the resistance groups op­
posed to Barre's rule mirrored the 
anarchic condition of the regime, 
thereby ensuring that the post-Barre 
era would be chaotic. The main resis­
tance forces were again based on 
clans: the Somali National Movement 
(SNM), established in 1981 by the 
Issaq of northern Somalia; the United 
Somali Congress (USC), formed in
1989 by the Hawiye of central 
Somalia; and the Somali Patriotic 
Movement (SPM), created in 1988 by 
the Ogadenis. Increasingly every 
public issue in Somalia came to be 
defined in terms of lineage and clan. It 
was therefore hardly surprising that 
when Barre was toppled by the USC 
in January 1991 the country was 
plunged into even deeper problems.
After Barre's fall the fighting escalated 
and many Somalis fled, seeking 
asylum in neighbouring Dijbouti, 
Ethiopia and Keyna. Barre's succes­
sor, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, sup­
ported by the local wing of the USC, 
had no resources with which to estab­
lish a functioning government. He did 
not even control the capital for more 
than a few months. At present there is
no effective government in 
Mogadishu, as President Mahdi con­
trols only the northern part of the capi­
tal. In the confusion which followed 
the overthrow of the Barre regime 
government offices and foreign em­
bassies were looted, hospitals and 
schools were ravaged and water and 
power supply in Mogadishu were dis­
rupted.
Since 1990 Somalia has been ungov­
ernable. The overthrow of Barre was 
delayed until January 1991 simply be­
cause alliances between power-seek- 
ing clan leaders could not endure. 
Somalia's relative stability in the 70s 
and early 80s depended on Barre's 
skilful manipulation of domestic 
politics. He maintained power by 
regularly suppressing critics and 
detaining opponents, by playing on 
clan interests and rivalries and, oc­
casionally, by buying out opposition 
groups with cash. However by the late 
1980s his military muscle had been 
weakened by inter-clan rivalries. It 
had also become increasingly obvious 
that he had neither the skill to 
manipulate sectional interests nor the 
vision to lead the country quickly out 
of its political and economic crises.
Clan rivalry intensified in the late 
1980s because of government corrup­
tion and the increasing economic 
malaise throughout the country. And
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corruption was rampant because state 
structures in Som alia were un­
developed and extremely weak. There 
were no democratic institutions, and 
there was no accountability on the 
part of political leaders. Somalia's 
economic problems were aggravated 
by Barre's misguided macroeconomic 
policies, by a lack of technical exper­
tise, and by poor project selection and 
implementation. The foreign aid 
Somalia received was not invested in 
profitable ventures, and by the late 
1980s the Somali economy had almost 
ground to a halt.
To make a bad situation worse, by the 
late 1980s Somalia had been deserted 
by all its friends and neglected by all 
but one of the Western powers. 
Washington terminated aid to Somalia 
in the wake of human rights violations 
in 1989. By 1990 Italy was the only 
Western power working with Somalia 
in the hope of containing the civil war, 
reforming the political system and 
putting the economy on a sound foot­
ing. It failed, largely because of 
Somalia's complex political problems, 
rampant corruption, and of course the 
feuding clans.
Barre's defeat in January 1991 ac­
celerated the disintegration of 
Somalia. First, the anti-Barre opposi­
tion had only their interest in the
defeat of Barre in common; other than 
that they hated each other almost as 
much as they did Barre. Second, when 
Barre was overthrown power was im­
mediately assumed by the Hawiye, a 
clan that played virtually no role in the 
anti-Barre struggle until a few months 
before his fall. Third, President Mahdi 
was appointed by the USC without 
consulting the other groups.
Since the overthrow of Barre there 
have been several clan-based civil 
wars in Somalia, and given the frag­
mentation of society it has been hard 
to gauge the direction of the fighting. 
Among the warring guerrilla groups 
now are Barre's own forces, which 
regrouped in southern Somalia and 
have been trying to topple the Mahdi 
regime. This is implausible, yet they 
are still capable of making life hard for 
the new government.
Around Mogadishu the USC has been 
fighting on several fronts—including 
against its own breakaway groups. On 
another front, the USC has had to deal 
with disaffection from the SPM and 
other political groups which have 
been dissatisfied with the post-Barre 
power-sharing arrangement.
After taking power Mahdi had 
proposed a 'conference of national 
reconciliation', but other groups 
refused to attend. The conference was
finally convened in June and July 
1991, but the various political groups 
were still so divided that it was hard 
to see how they would coordinate 
their programs.
Mediation efforts in Somalia have 
failed for several reasons: the various 
clans and sub-clans still hate each 
other vehemently; the dan leaders or 
warlords have virtually no legitimacy 
and can be abandoned by their sup­
porters at any time; and the number of 
clan militias keeps rising. Somalia's 
inter- and intra-clan rivalry can be 
resolved only when clan leaders or 
warlords agree to unite and persuade 
their supporters to do the same. But 
without tangible political and 
economic rewards to show for years of 
fighting, the warlords have been un­
able to persuade their fighters to put 
down arms. In his heyday Barre suc­
ceeded in bribing clan leaders with 
political office and economic rewards, 
but the country is now so poor and 
disorganised that such rewards are no 
longer tenable. In the long term only 
strong state structures, efficient and 
accountable government and ap­
propriate macroeconomic policies 
will save Somalia.
SAMUEL MAKINDA teaches in social 
sciences at Murdoch University.
Jaywalking
It was a momentous event in radio journalism. Brett 
Whiteley had been dead for less than a day and the 
JJJ reporter was hot on the case. Interviewing a 
gallery owner she got to the point: "Just how 
influential was he?"
That's rather typical of JJJ: in pursuit 
of shoehorning a perceived point of 
cultural interest into terms acceptable 
to their idea of a youthful point of 
view, JJJ boil Whiteley down to how 
much you should care he's dead. It's the 
sort of thing you're likely to find every 
day on the station: perhaps well- 
meaning, but often just crass. As 
Australia's one and only 'Youth 
Network' (though Sydney and Mel­
bourne both have male youth- 
oriented, commercially successful
MMMs) the station inhabits a curious 
place in radio. Mildly 'intellectual', it's 
designed for the 15-24 age group, the 
inheritors of a strange white liberal 
middle-class suburban landscape 
which can only be populated by the 
sort of 'typical' families of ABC 
dramas and sitcoms.
This is a far cry from the assumed JJJ 
audience of the 70s and early 80s: cof­
fee/beer/ coffee-skulling, trendy- 
haircutted, casually-university-
attending, t-shirt-wearing, already-
been-overseas-once-and-hope-to-go
-again-next-year music fans.
One might argue that it's better to 
cater for the odd suburban teen reject 
here and there as a Youth Network 
than to wallow in the Golden Oldies 
of the New Wave for the sake of an 
ageing band of 'Jays' lovers. Yet JJJ 
doesn't have many listeners these 
days anyway, probably because it 
doesn't play the music that the 
majority of kids really enjoy—it 
brings too much of its aged 
knowledge of what's gone before. 
Aussie MOR rocker Rick Price, for in­
stance, is hardly likely to get a look in 
on JJJ because he's not a 30 year-old's 
idea of what a 15 year-old should like.
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Triple J
Yet his willowy ballads (and equally 
willowy long brown hair and mean­
ingful gaze) probably make him the 
current favourite of the teen audience.
It would not be too unfair to suggest 
that JJJ often takes a particularly 
patronising attitude to mainstays of 
teen life (TV soapies for instance) 
which serves as a policy compromise: 
while JJJ cannot condone mainstream 
teen culture, it can still mention it 
knowingly (if somewhat dismissive- 
ly). Part of the problem is of course the 
difficulty of appealing both to 15 year- 
olds and their 24 year-old elder si­
blings—quite a stretch, when you 
think about it.
However, this 'sophisticated' attitude 
leads to curious (and irritating) conse­
quences. One JJJ DJ recently an­
nounced that he would have a new 
track from Morrissey coming up in the 
next hour, adding sarcastically that he 
was "looking forward to that". One 
wondered, if playing Morrissey is so 
stupid, why do it? And if JJJ plays 
Morrissey because some people in 
their audience like him, does that 
mean they're saying parts of their 
audience are stupid? The DJ's com­
ment rather neatly encapsulated JJJ's 
dilemma: despite its best (or worst) 
instincts, it cannot comfortably en­
dorse any particular musical artist at 
any particular moment. Morrissey is 
cool to some people in the 15-24 age 
group; to others he is a wimp and a 
whinger. Mainstream radio—like the 
MMMs in Sydney and Melbourne— 
cannot easily make value judgements 
on music because they only play cur­
rent hits and items from the 'Heritage 
Rock' canon (see John Potts on 
'Heritage Rock' in Philip Hayward's 
From Pop to Punk to Postmodernism, 
Allen and Unwin, 1992).
Which is not to say that JJJ does not 
have its own canon. Though many of 
the announcers who created the 
original Sydney 2JJJ are no longer 
there, JJJ still seems to adhere to a very 
inner-city Sydney-based view of 
music. There are certainly no garage 
bands on the station: the closest you'll 
get are people with an 'underground' 
heritage, and even they are treated 
with some trepidation.
Again probably because of its Sydney 
base, JJJ has always had leanings 
towards the mainstream end of 
'alternative', and its recent rejection of 
an 'alternative' audience has probably
not made a huge difference to its 
music programming. DJs have little 
say in what they play and either 
apologise for or criticise sarcastically 
anything that's unfamiliar. (Though it 
might not make a lot of difference if 
they did; when the BBC's Radio One 
allowed their DJs to make a choice in 
the music they played a few years ago, 
they found the announcers played less 
new material than they had pre­
viously. Everyone has their 'golden 
age'.) One listener reports calling up 
JJJ to congratulate a DJ for playing a 
particularly 'different' track, only to 
be told by the crestfallen announcer 
that "it was supposed to be a joke!"
On the whole, however, the new JJJ is 
not the unmitigated disaster that fear 
of the unknown might have led fans to 
expect. A breath of fresh air might 
have been just what the station 
needed—though the sackings in late 
1990 which accompanied the 'new 
look' could have been handled better 
in almost any other way. And while 
the youth of Australia might have an
inbuilt resistance to anything not in­
cluding Coke ads and announcers 
who sound like they're shouting 
through a megaphone, one can only 
assume that every few days, some­
where around Australia, some spotty 
adolescent accidentally flips their dial 
a few degrees to the left and hears a 
program or a song that changes their 
mind.
That, after all, was the cry of the new 
wave groups: "if we can change just 
one person's attitude!" And that's 
probably the most we can hope for 
from our Youth Network. Whether it's 
worth using so much taxpayer's 
money on such a tiny cause is 
debatable. But if it's a toss-up for the 
ABC between JJJ or another drama in 
the Brides of Christ mould, I for one will 
be rooting for the Jays.
Just as long as I don't have to listen to 
it more than once every three months.
D A V ID  N IC H O L S w rite s  fo r  teen 
magazines, and is ambivalent towards 
Morrissey.
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Casual Sex?
In July, the Australian Federation of AIDS 
Organisations (AFAO), the peak body representing 
the non-government and non-medical sector, 
formally proposed shifting resources in AIDS 
education to aim primarily at reinforcing behaviour 
changes in the frontline communities.
On the face of it, gay activists and 
AIDS workers have come to the same 
conclusion as the most conservative 
sectors of the medical elite: AIDS 
education should focus on sex be­
tween men.
However, this apparent unanimity 
disguises quite counterposed 
strategies. In the 'traditional public 
health' corner lurks a preference for a 
quarantine of AIDS-affected people— 
a preference based on generic distrust 
of patients. Following this approach, 
gay venues would be closed, the Syd­
ney Gay Mardi Gras banned, sex 
workers rehabilitated, and drug ad­
dicts dosed with methadone daily. 
Conservative doctors, such as AMA 
head Bruce Shepherd, want to reassert 
medical control over AIDS preven­
tion.
New HIV infections peaked in 
Australia in 1983-84, and are now es­
timated at 300-600 per year. Now, as 
then, the overwhelming majority of 
infections are made possible by un­
protected anal sex between men. Of 
course, this is not to say that there are 
no infections outside that popula­
tion—around 700 women are reported 
to be HIV positive—but rather that the 
pattern of infection in this country has 
remained much more localised than in 
comparable countries. However, 
while the general population in 
Australia has a high level of aware­
ness of HIV transmission, there has 
been very little behaviour change by 
people outside communities specifi­
cally targeted for AIDS education.
Australia's relative success in lower­
ing rates of new infections has been 
due to a number of factors: prevention 
efforts by the gay communities in the 
mid 1980s, the organisation of sex 
'vorkers to insist on an industry stand­
ard of condom use, and the early intro­
duction of needle and syringe ex­
change programs.
The co-operative and planned ap­
proach sponsored by Neal Blewett as 
federal health minister stands in stark 
contrast to the approach of many 
European and North American 
countries.
However, the new apparent consen­
sus between doctors' groups and 
AIDS organisations is not the result of 
complacency. With almost 17,000 
people notified as testing positive for 
HIV nationally, even if no new infec­
tions occur, the burden of illness, 
death and grieving will become more 
intense as asymptomatic infections 
'mature'.
While the cost and urgency of treat­
ment and care increases, so too does 
the difficulty in sustaining behaviour 
changes in the frontline communities. 
Ten years into the epidemic, gay men 
in Sydney may be finding it hard to 
remember always to use condoms and 
stay sober, to keep giving money and 
time to AIDS groups, and to keep up 
volunteer care programs when many 
or all of their friends have died. Young 
men coming onto the gay scene may 
feel that AIDS is old news and affects 
only the older, leather-clad set. Some 
Asian migrants, who make up per­
haps 10% of the gay community in 
Sydney, may feel that, just as they are 
marginalised by racism, so too is AIDS 
a distant concern.
In an extremely youth-oriented cul­
ture, older gay men may feel that they 
cannot afford to say no to unsafe 
sexual opportunities. And the 10-13% 
of gay men who have used 'speed', 
cocaine, heroin or ecstasy in the last 12 
months may shun unprotected sex but 
still share infected needles because 
they are 'not really junkies'.
And, of course, men involved and 
identifying with the gay community
make up only a minority of men who 
have sex with men. Although paid or 
volunteer outreach educators work in 
most Australian cities, only a small 
percentage of the men who have 
anonymous sex in car parks or on 
beaches and parks have ever spoken 
to one.
Allocations to AIDS education and so­
cial research have very often been 
directed to people only marginally af­
fected by the epidemic. If, as seems 
likely, AIDS money is to be devoted 
increasingly towards the international 
pharmaceutical companies for anti­
viral and preventive therapies, dif­
ferent community sector groups may 
compete for dwindling education 
resources. In this scenario, HIV posi­
tive people, gay men, ethnic and 
Aboriginal communities, drug injec­
tors, sex workers, and women would 
increasingly stake their claims against 
each other, and against mainstream 
programs.
Within the Australian National Coun­
cil on AIDS, as well as within AFAO, 
there have been strong arguments for 
a shift of research and education em­
phasis towards the communities 
where the major burden of infection 
has occurred and continues to occur. 
The national strategy proposal 
launched by AFAO in July also seeks 
faster action on the availability of 
treatment and on legislative changes 
to eliminate barriers to HIV health 
promotion programs: stronger anti- 
discrimination laws, tighter confiden­
tiality laws, and the repeal of 
anti-homosexual laws, Summary Of­
fences laws and laws penalising drug 
users and sex workers.
The national strategy developed 
under Neal Blewett in 1989 ends in 
mid-1993. The stakes are high in the 
debate on the shape of the strategy 
that will take Australia through the 
next five years—years when the bur­
den of illness will be greatest, and 
when Australia's progress to date will 
be put to the test.
KEN D A V IS  w orks on p o licy  
co-ordination for the AIDS Council of 
NSW.
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THE STATE
At the end of the 1980s the old contest between social 
democracy and economic liberalism had ended in 
stalemate. Paul Hirst contends the debate's run its 
course. What's needed is a new conception of providing 
public services outside the state: it's a matter o f thick 
welfare, thin collectivism.
T he 70s ended throughout the 'anglo- saxon' world with a determined in­tellectual and political assault on 
state bureaucracy, collectivism and 
the welfare state. In the UK, USA, Australia and 
New Zealand, more or less sustained efforts were 
made to curb the growth in public spending on 
welfare and to rationalise provision along the 
lines of economic liberal doctrines.1 Tight 
budgetary controls, cuts in direct taxation, the 
privatisation of services and tax subsidies for 
market provision were intended to promote the 
primacy of private over public provision in wel­
fare and to reduce state collective provision to a 
minimal safety net that only the poorest would 
use through dire necessity. By now it is clear that
such economic liberal solutions to welfare 
problems are in ruins. They have not improved 
service delivery or quality; they have not tackled 
the perceived problem of an 'underclass' trapped 
in a 'dependency culture'; and they have not 
contributed to increasing the rate of economic 
growth by reducing the overall tax burden on the 
mass of income earners.
The economic liberal agenda has lost its intellectual 
legitimacy, but the mass attitudes that provided political 
legitimacy for free market quick-fix solutions are still there. 
In the UK the Labour Party went to the polls in the April
1992 election with a determined effort to present itself as 
the party of welfare, to claim that the people had 'seen 
through' economic liberalism, and to suggest that higher 
income earners would accept proposed tax rises as fair. It 
failed. None of the presidential candidates in the US
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proposes seriously to tackle the problems of poverty and 
urban decay, despite the spur of the Los Angeles riots.
J K Galbraith's A Culture of Contentment has provided a 
straightforward and widely accepted explanation for the 
failure of redistributionist and welfare politics. According 
to Galbraith, the postwar mixture of sustained economic 
growth and welfare spending provided the means for the 
majority to escape into relatively comfortable and 'middle 
class' conditions. The consequence of this was that collec­
tivist solutions began to seem to them steadily less neces­
sary. In this scenario the new mass 'middle class' is 
reluctant to make major sacrifices for that socially con­
tainable and politically ineffectual minority which has not 
benefited in the same way. Welfare states are thus the 
victims of their own past successes.
There is an element of truth in this thesis, but it overstates 
the extent to which people are simply tax resistant, and it 
underplays the fact that they also have other good reasons 
not to support simply spending more on existing forms of 
bureaucratic state welfare. The real problem is that sup­
porters of the extension of state welfare services have been 
unable to come up with a clear new strategy that encom­
passes reforms to both funding and service delivery. 
Rather they have sought to break down public resistance 
to 'more of the same' with moralising and with the 
patronage of possessing superior principles. Yet resistance 
to the expansion of state welfare will only be overcome by 
new ideas that inspire people, and not by schoolteacherly 
social democratic exhortation to be altruistic and pay up.
There are three main problems which limit public willing­
ness to be taxed for welfare provision:
1. Throughout the 'anglo-saxon' world we find the deadly 
combination of low economic growth and high expecta­
tions of private consumption on the part of the mass of the 
employed. The result is resistance to taxation—even 
though survey evidence also shows that a substantial 
majority would prefer high standards of welfare services 
like education and health to be publicly provided at low 
direct cost to the consumer.
2. People are widely resistant to the bureaucratic deforma­
tions of mass welfare services (administrative discretion, 
low public accountability and the absence of a 'consumer' 
culture in the provision of services). People do not want to 
be supplicants, to have to wait and to be treated rudely in 
squalid circumstances.
3. The alleged benefits of national public services—fairness 
and equal treatment—are by no means apparent to con­
sumers or available in fact. 'National' services are by no 
means uniform: there is considerable variability in the way 
services are delivered between regions and households in 
most countries. Nor are 'universal' benefits equally dis­
tributed or specific services and benefits effectively tar­
geted at those most in meed.
The problem that most supporters of a social democratic 
mass welfare ethic fail to accept is that bureaucracies do
not empower citizens. The vast majority of citizens expect 
to be treated as articulate, sensible individuals in charge of 
their own affairs and not as objects of tutelage. Yet state 
welfare bureaucracies habitually patronise and at worst 
demean a high proportion of recipients of their services. In 
the UK, for example, post-1945 local authority housing 
involved many absurd and humiliating restrictions on 
tenants. One could not even paint one's front door the 
colour one pleased. In the UK John Major has tried to 
exploit this dissatisfaction with 'Citizen's Charters' which 
are supposed to specify the minimum service standards 
the public has a right to expect, and the mechanisms for 
obtaining relief if they are not met. Likewise, his ad­
ministration has sought to improve the accountability of 
public servants. Yet measures such as these make little 
sense in conditions where service failure is largely deter­
mined by government underfunding, and where account­
ability is a 'top-down' process that reduces the autonomy 
of welfare personnel in relation to their senior managers 
but does not directly empower the public. John Major has 
tried to demoticise economic liberalism but, in the absence 
of major new ideas from his government about how to 
improve the funding and delivery of services, he is hardly 
likely to do more than marginally improve welfare 
provision.
The position is, therefore, one of stalemate. Social 
democrats have no new ideas and the public will not trust 
them to spend more on the old services. Economic liberals 
have failed to revitalise or transform those stagnant wel­
fare states which survive, albeit in an underfunded and 
ineffective state. Indeed, mostly those welfare states sub­
sist merely in the absence of anything better, and are run 
by rightwing rulers who have little sympathy for them. 
How can the deadlock be broken? The answer, I believe, 
can be summed up in two sentences. First, the provision of 
public welfare and other services should be devolved to 
self-governing voluntary associations. Second, such as­
sociations should be enabled to obtain public funds to 
provide such services for their members. The principle of 
social governance involved here is called 
'associationalism'. Its fundamental objective is to renew 
modern societies by transforming the private/public 
division; making the 'private' a sphere of social coopera­
tion and collective governance, making the 'public' as far 
as possible nothing more than the mechanism for provid­
ing rules and funds that enable self-governing 'private' 
institutions to work.
Associationalism is a form of social organisation that can 
deliver all the political benefits economic liberals claim to 
seek from the market without the same scale of economic 
costs and injustices that unregulated markets impose. As­
sociationalism simultaneously proposes solutions to the 
problems of funding, service delivery and citizens' invol­
vement. It is attractive to citizens seeking greater 
autonomy; it is easy to understand in principle; and it 
explodes the terms of the conflict between economic 
liberalism and welfare collectivism.
Associationalism offers, first of all, extended governance 
without big government. Economic liberalism fostered the 
delusion that the answer to over-extended and unaccount­
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able government was deregulation. The result has been the 
unwanted and unintended consequences of 'free' markets. 
Governance is essential; modem industrial societies need 
extensive 'policing' to ensure that acceptable standards are 
set and complied with. This is true even in straightforward 
commercial transactions where consumers have to be able 
to trust the honesty of the vendor and be aware that they 
can obtain relief through public agencies if that trust proves 
to be unfounded. The problem is government not gover­
nance: government becomes too big, too multiform and too 
bureaucratic in struggling to cope with those diverse tasks 
that complex modern societies of necessity impose.
The advantage of self-governing voluntary agencies rather 
than state bureaucracies is threefold. First, personnel will 
be more committed to an agency with whose principles 
they are in agreement and which is chosen by them as a 
place of work for that reason. Second, self-governing 
voluntary associations will be internally accountable to 
their members; this ensures a first-line form of policing of 
service delivery by members, and reduces the load on the 
state. And third, the delivery of welfare services through 
voluntary agencies effects a separation between the service 
provider and the state as the 'governor of governors'. In 
contrast at present the state is in the contradictory position 
of providing services through its bureaucratic agencies and 
also acting as the guarantor of the standard of those ser­
vices.
In the second place associationalism offers thick welfare with 
thin collectivism. Bureaucratic collectivist delivery of wel­
fare typically entails high administrative discretion on the 
part of providers and low consumer choice. For that reason 
it is less and less attractive to the even moderately success­
ful. However, market-based insurance schemes can hardly 
serve as the general answer to this problem. They can 
assure a high and uniform level of welfare provision only 
in a society of mass affluence—one that does not have a 
substantial pool of long-term unemployed or a significant 
underclass. Even then, market-based systems entail 
serious distortions in provision due to strong financial 
incentives for suppliers to over-deliver services.
Associationalism, by contrast, both promotes consumer 
choice and—because of the joint producer-consumer self- 
governance of associations—also provides a mutual check 
on the tendencies to overconsume and overproduce that 
are inherent in any form of decentralised welfare 
provision. In such a system individuals can craft the pack­
age of services they need. This is because of the high level 
°f choice in the type and mode of services on offer, due to 
the fact that service providers are voluntary organisations 
*n competition, and their provision is mainly demand-led. 
Consumers have a large element of choice in the services 
they receive, but also considerable discretion in determin­
ing the overall level of funding for them. Thus when it 
comes to paying for services, individuals will tend to be­
have differently from the way they do now. Employed 
j-^nsumers with a substantial disposable income will have 
high discretion in controlling what they get; therefore they 
^ill be willing to adjust expenditure to meet their own 
perceived needs. The poor will get minimum entitlements, 
“Ut still will be able to choose which agencies should fulfil
them. The system will not be inherently egalitarian, but it 
will tend to promote higher welfare spending and incline 
individuals toward meeting their needs through collective 
consumption. Welfare expenditures will tend to rise to the 
extent that consumers see they can control services and that 
they benefit from consuming collectively. Associationalist 
welfare systems thus have the potential to unblock the tax 
constraint on welfare spending. Because they take the 
responsibility for making spending decisions from the 
state and place it in the hands of consumers, they promote 
real consumer choice in any ways markets do not, and they 
ensure accountability to consumers in a way markets do 
not.
‘People have good reasons 
not to support simply 
spending more "
Associationalism is a well-established idea and its prin­
ciples are easy to understand. Why, then, has it not already 
gained widespread acceptance as the new basis for welfare 
systems? The answer: it is not a technical quick-fix solution. 
It requires fundamental changes in the forms of authority 
predominant in both state and civil society. Social 
democrats, for example, tend to be hostile to as­
sociationalism on the grounds that it lessens the power of 
the state. They remain committed to their perception that 
only the state can offer true welfare, because it is supposed 
to be able to deliver universal and uniform benefits. Yet this 
is an illusion; no system of welfare can reliably and over 
the long run ensure equality and uniformity in the way 
desired by classic social democracy.
An associationalist welfare system involves a quite dif­
ferent political principle, It offers greater empowerment, 
rather than equality of outcomes, as its means to the goal 
of social justice. It recognises that such empowerment 
cannot come from state centralism and the inevitable 
bureaucracy that accom panies it, but only from 
decentralisation and a degree of popular control. As­
sociationalism is based on the principle of federation—that 
is the principle that activities should be administered and 
controlled at the lowest level feasible, and that 'higher' 
authorities should be limited to their specific functions and 
unable to appropriate those of the agencies and authorities 
'below' them. Associationalism is thus decentralising and 
pluralistic, and looks messy to statists because of the in­
herent weakness of top-down control in such a federative 
system.
The federalist and associationalist position is no longer the 
irrelevancy it appeared to be when the militaristic 
Keynesian welfare state was a going concern. The period 
of prolonged industrialised wars and cold wars between 
the great powers required the complete social mobilisation 
of populations. Then the welfare state had a clear ration­
ale—as the locus of a pact with organised labour and as the
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orchestrator of the welfare measures necessary to 'social 
efficiency'. Yet the rationale no longer holds. The problem 
for social democrats is that the national state has lost its 
centrality as the principal economic and social regulator 
and yet it is essential to their project. It has lost the capacity 
to determine the level of economic activity with the demise 
of 'Keynesian' strategies of national economic manage­
ment
‘The national state has lost 
its centrality’
Regional economic regulation and the regionalisation of 
economic activity have grown apace. The divisions in the 
levels of prosperity within nations are as substantial as 
those between them. National states are at once losing 
salience upwards, to economic blocs like the European 
Community, and downwards, to regionalist practices of 
economic regulation and regional sources of citizen iden­
tity. This suggests that in Europe at least the old project of 
a 'uniform' national welfare state is probably doomed. Italy 
and Germany offer clear examples of such regionalist rejec­
tion of national redistribution. The regional autonomist 
Northern Leagues, for example, protest that the south of 
Italy produces 25% of GDP and consumes 49% of it. Ger­
man working class voters in the western Lander are unwill­
ing to carry the main tax burden of integration of the east.
The only possible long-run answer to this crisis of national 
states in Europe is a 'federalist' solution in which EC, 
national and regional governments accept specific and par­
tial functions in welfare. The EC would set minimum 
framework standards for social regulation and social wel­
fare, and then ensure the supra-national redistribution be­
tween rich and poor regions to meet them. This project is 
itself problematic, since national governments are unwill­
ing to concede such powers, and such common standards 
are currently quite low. Regions would then be free to 
determine welfare policies consistent with their explicit 
political objectives and their underlying economic perfor­
mance.
Such a regionalised and federal system can in theory work 
either with associations or markets playing the main role 
in welfare. The real problem for economic liberals in accept­
ing associationalism is not their addiction to the 'free' 
market. Rather, the real stumbling block is their commit­
ment to a strong central state that protects market freedoms 
(and which in particular ensures that there is no political or 
social obstruction of the market from local government or 
voluntary associations like labour unions) as well as their 
commitment to corporate dominance of economic and so­
cial provision. In fact, contrary to economic liberal ideol­
ogy, centralised state power and top-down corporate 
management go together. Decentralisation and the prin­
ciple of self-governing voluntary associations are threats to
economic 'liberals' (with a few honourable and genuinely 
libertarian exceptions), because the freedoms they really 
value are those for corporations to act in weakly-regulated 
markets. Modern economic liberalism is passionately ad­
dicted to 'management', and convinced that top-down 
authority and hierarchy are the only routes to social ef­
ficiency.
Associationalism would be a radical change from this 
managerial mentality. It would break up the current os­
sified private hierarchies that ensure that most of 'civil 
society' is a domain of authority and not of freedom. The 
citizen, at work and in purchasing private welfare (in­
surance), is at the mercy of largely unaccountable corpora­
tions. Associationalism, by beginning to restore citizen 
power, would threaten the corporate dominance of 'civil 
society'. The chief reason associationalism has not been 
seized upon as a solution to welfare problems is because it 
is radical. It is at once too decentralist for social democratic 
conservatives wedded to the nation state, and too 
democratic for corporate apologists in the guise of 
economic liberals. It might, therefore, appear to be mar­
ginal—except that existing doctrines of social organisation 
are bankrupt, the problems of welfare provision are very 
real, and it is implausible that sophisticated and in­
dividuated publics in industrialised societies will continue 
to accept passively the existing patterns of authority 
forever.
Associationalism, moreover, can appeal to and unite 
diverse social forces, break down the old opposition be­
tween Left and Right, and can profit from a variety of 
reform strategies. Indeed, one could argue that the one 
thing holding back the crystallisation of a variety of groups 
around an associationalist strategy has been the absence of 
a common concept that allow such diverse entities to com­
municate and to recognise one another as having shared 
interests. Thus the task of developing the concept is urgent, 
and the core of that development must be a credible model 
of social organisation.
That said, it is impossible to present in any depth the 
possible models of an associationalist welfare state within 
the compass of a short essay. We have suffered enough from 
the relentless organisational monism of economic 
liberalism, where there is no alternative and only one 
simple, comprehensive 'Year Zero' solution. As­
sociationalism has the advantage that it can be added 
slowly and experimentally to existing welfare states as a 
principle of renewal and reform. It is not just another slick 
idea to attract funding, since it offers both recipients and 
providers of welfare a say in its governance and delivery. 
It is also compatible with a variety of methods of funding, 
and it can co-exist with those elements of collectivism and 
bureaucracy that are inevitable and inescapable in a com­
plex contemporary society.
The easiest way to present a picture of such a welfare state 
is to state some basic principles:
* Provision is by voluntary self-governing organisations 
that are partnerships between the recipients and the 
providers of the service: such associations will be at least
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formally democratic and recipients will have an annual 
right of exit.
* Such organisations are funded predominantly from 
public sources (possible methods are outlined below) and 
are subject to public inspection and standard-setting.
* Any voluntary organisation—Church, trade union, 
charitable trust—may establish as wide or narrow a range 
of services as its members choose (for instance, a Muslim 
charitable foundation may wish to establish schools, hospi­
tals, old people's homes and so on). It is assumed, therefore, 
that (at least in urban areas) there will be a range of com­
peting services with which citizens may choose to register.
* All such organisations must meet conditions of registra­
tion to receive public funds. Among these would be com­
pliance with public standards, acceptance of exit rights and 
recipient choice (for instance, to register with a Catholic 
school but with a 'neutral' trust hospital), and participation 
in the public/associational governance of the whole sys­
tem. It is assumed here that the setting of standards, alloca­
tion of funding and inspection would be 
'consociational'—that is, governance as far as possible 
would be by representatives of associations acting either 
by service (such as education or health) or regionally.
‘The model avoids the 
tendency for 
well-educated, articulate 
citizens to dominate’
Such a fully developed associationalist welfare state would 
be 'confederal' in that the core organisation of provision 
would be the region, at which level public funds (including 
inter-regional transfers) would be distributed. Associa­
tions would co-operate with one another in the public 
governance of the distinct services and of the whole sys­
tem, sending representatives to public bodies which would 
perform the central regulative and distributory functions. 
Voluntary associations would thus enter into public gover­
nance in a decentralised state; the associationalist principle 
would not only renew welfare provision, but also the state 
and governance itself.
In this confederal welfare state the associations would be 
democratically self-governing internally and would also 
contribute to a system of federated indirect democracy in 
the governance of the regional welfare state. Repre­
sentative democratic bodies would remain at central and 
regional level, and would be the standard-setters of last 
resort. Citizens would have several 'votes', as well as the 
crucial power of exit from direct service providers. The 
state would retain major reserve powers over welfare 
provision—for instance, power to curb excessive growth in 
aggregate spending and to challenge standards of 
provision—but it would not have the unilateral powers
available to politicians and officials in bureaucratic collec­
tivist systems. Welfare professionals would be subject to 
strong public pressure and yet have far more say in how 
their own unit and the service of which it is a part is run.
How might such a welfare state be funded? The answer is 
that it could use for different purposes and in different 
combinations all or any of the present methods: general 
taxation, public or private insurance, markets and private 
purchases, charitable donations and so on. A citizen's en­
titlements would depend on the precise nature of this mix. 
I will assume for simplicity's sake that all welfare spending 
is funded from general taxation. Another important ele­
ment in funding such a welfare state would be a Guaran­
teed Minimum Income (GMI) scheme, in which every 
citizen has a (low) basic income assured by the state. This 
GMI would be exempt from taxation, so that it could be 
supplemented, for instance, from part-time or casual earn­
ings without loss of benefit. The minimum level might be 
pitched at, say, A$500 per adult per month. Assuming 
current levels of unemployment (11%) this would still be 
economically sustainable. It would give citizens just suf­
ficient income to pursue private activities the market does 
not value but which may be socially useful, or to undertake 
voluntary service. A GMI scheme would thus increase the 
potential personnel of the 'welfare state' at low cost. In an 
ageing society such a GMI scheme may become not only 
economically viable but essential. It may be more ration^ 
than collectivist welfare, if household/families are to be 
given the resources to care for elderly partners/relatives.
More specific entitlements would depend on needs and 
status (a school age child, a disabled person) and would 
relate to specific provision areas like health or education. 
The assumption here is that each citizen would be entitled 
to register annually with a service provider for each 
relevant service and receive a publicly specified quantity 
and quality of the service. Funding to associations would 
thus follow the election of citizens to use a particular 
service. I assume that the vast majority of citizens would 
re-register with the same service provider and that the 
annual public costs of turnover from one provider to 
another would be small. Inevitably, certain public services 
like policing, social work supervision of childrearing or 
compulsory psychiatry would not be at the citizen's discre­
tion and would be similar in form to bureaucratic collec­
tivist welfare today, except that the service providers might 
be voluntary associations fulfilling public contracts (such 
as a co-operative of social workers or a private psychiatric 
hospital).
If the desire is to build in strong components of citizens' 
choice in funding and to keep state discretion to a mini­
mum, then the following methods might be used. Each 
service would develop (through the consociational 
machinery) a formula for funds per citizen election (de­
pendent on age and status). Voluntary associations would 
thus receive annually funds proportionate to their previous 
years' registered (and publicly audited) membership for a 
given service. This might make up the bulk of the welfare 
budget available to associations (say 70%). A number of 
objections need to be dealt with at this point. It might be 
argued, for instance, that associations would merely com-
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pete and not co-operate, that they would encourage ineffi­
cient duplication of expensive capital equipment, and that 
professionals would have little esprit de corps but be frag­
mented in specific associations. To meet these objections, 
two additional sources of citizens' election or voluntary 
initiative might be available. First, taxpayers might be 
enabled to allocate a portion of their annual tax payments 
(amounting to, say, 5% of the total budget for associations) 
to a limited number of publicly registered associations of 
their choice (say 5). This would allow citizens to target 
issues of public concern through choosing on what to 
spend a portion of their taxes.
Again, about 25% of the budget for associations could be 
assigned to be spent through the consociational machinery 
on major new projects, on bids for extra funds or on co­
operative ventures. This would give the consociational 
machinery real teeth, encourage associations to participate 
actively in it and provide professionals in a particular 
service with the means to co-operate across associations. It 
would both provide for major new capital spending and 
encourage associations to manage a particular service in a 
region as co-operatively as possible, developing common 
facilities where it was necessary and efficient to do so.
The many other complexities and difficulties of such an 
associationalist system cannot be explored here. One in 
particular does need to be dealt with, however. The associa­
tive model may appear to favour the well-educated middle 
classes with a 'consumer' mentality and the skill to 'work' 
the self-governing component of the system, defeating the 
poor and unskilled by the complexity of choices required. 
Actually, by giving the power of 'exit', the system would 
empower the poor to a considerable degree. They could 
walk away from bad schools, for example—something that 
is difficult to do in a collectivist-bureaucratic system. And 
because it does not require them to participate extensively 
in the democratic machinery of an association, it avoids the 
tendency for well-educated articulate citizens to dominate, 
which bedevils, for instance, school committees. Likewise, 
because the system could easily be made open to cam­
paigning associations, it would enable those groups active­
ly concerned to improve the position of the poor to obtain 
public funds by persuading poor people to make elections 
on their behalf. It would also enable alternative groups and 
non-establishment groups to set their own welfare agendas 
in ways that current bureaucratic welfare states do not 
permit (for example, providing proper medical services for 
'travellers'). For these reasons it has a strong potential to 
attract radicals as well as those who favour consumer 
choice.
Associationalism could contribute to resolving the current 
impasse of both policy ideas and public attitudes in the area 
of welfare. It would, as we have seen, promote greater 
citizens' choice and give citizens the initiative in funding 
rather than bureaucrats. It thus provides citizens with a 
rationale for spending more on welfare. Associationalism 
also offers a model that could be extended to other public 
and private services and their governance. Indeed, it offers 
a new model of governance: publicising the 'private' sphere 
of voluntary associations, and decentralising and 
democratising the public domain through self-governing 
associations.
Associationalism also has the immense advantage that it is 
tied to neither Right nor Left; likewise well-to-do and poor 
alike can exploit its possibilities. As such, it is the one social 
doctrine that spans the major divisions of our current 
politics and enables diverse groups, political and apolitical, 
to co-operate while pursuing their own several projects. It 
is neither utopian nor dependent on a single social 'carrier'. 
Of all the current major doctrines of social organisation, it 
is the one that has not failed. Unlike the socialism of the 
traditional Left and the corporate apologists of the Right in 
that it gives the power of choice to the people, as­
sociationalism has a chance of becoming truly popular.
PAUL H IR ST is professor of social theory at B irkbeck  Col­
lege, University of London. His Associative Democracy w ill be 
published by Polity Press later this year.
1. 'Welfare' is understood here in the broader sense (current in 
America) of that changing bundle of public services that the 
state determines is necessary for its citizens to lead a 
satisfactory life as members of the political community. This 
includes sectors such as health and education, as well as 
'welfare' in the narrower British-Australian sense of the word.
2. This is by no means generous, and would be fiscally 
supportable under existing conditions. Indeed, it would 
probably cost less to administer than the existing structure of 
discretionary and program-specific benefits.
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CIVIC
Centre
The values of social citizenship are often seen as a 
democratic ideal for the 21st century. 
Gary Wickham and Gavin Kendall demur. They argue 
that citizenship is in reality a technical device for 
government, and that the grand social claims for it need to 
be scaled down.
c itizenship is catching a lot more at­tention on the Left of the political spectrum  these days. As hopes (and/or desires) fade for apocalyptic 
social change, many on the Left are turning to 
older ambitions traditionally associated with 
liberalism, and in particular liberal democracy. 
One of these ambitions is an expanded notion of 
social citizenship. In recent years, citizenship has 
been adopted as a key principle in the political 
armoury of many on the Left. This has given the 
term a deceptively 'progressive' tinge.
Yet we want to argue here that while citizenship as a value 
has its merits, the Left should not get carried away by it. 
While it is often seen by liberals and radicals alike as a 
means of guaranteeing certain political outcomes, we want 
to argue that it is better seen as a technical tool, a device
used by governemnt in managing populations, and one 
which guarantees no outcomes. If a government wants to 
improve the quality of life in a particular city, for example, 
or to promote the benefits of ethnic and cultural diversity, 
it will usually aim to do this by trying to make better 
citizens. It will try to make people proud to live and work 
in the city concerned and/or it will attempt to make a more 
tolerant body of citizens.
However, the role of citizenship is also rather more exten­
sive than this. In being a technical device, citizenship invol­
ves governments actually 'making' citizens. That is, 
citizenship is concerned with forming certain types of per­
sons as citizens—and, more particularly, as certain types of 
citizens, depending on the specific imperative of the par­
ticular government concerned. This actual formation of 
citizens involves definite administrative techniques on the 
part of governments—techniques, if you like, of citizen 
manufacture. The aim of these techniques is to identify 
needs and', at the same time, to begin to address these needs. 
This means constant calculation and assessment. These
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techniques of calculation and assessment vary in form 
depending on the requirements of the specific government 
concerned, and on the mode of government involved. For 
example, there has been a shift in modern western countries 
from the middle of the 18th century onwards to a mode of 
government featuring much greater reliance on 
bureaucracy. This new 'modern' mode of government has 
involved the rise of certain bureaucratic techniques of cal­
culation and assessment which concentrate on more 
detailed records ('statistics') about each member of the 
Population. The specific practical techniques of calculation 
are closely related to the sort of 'citizen formation' a par­
ticular government can aim to produce.
This point can be reinforced by comparing techniques of 
citizen manufacture used in the ancient Roman census with 
these modern bureaucratic techniques. In republican Rome 
a census was held every five years.1 The site for the census 
was the campus martinus, the military training ground. It 
was the responsibility of the censor to register each citizen. 
However, registration meant something quite different 
then: it was an audit of a citizen's wealth and of his (women 
were not citizens in ancient Rome) moral character. The 
census even involved a purifying act of sacrifice, the 
lustrum. Compare this with the modern techniques of 
citizen calculation and assessment we discussed above, 
which simply record information about citizens and render 
this information statistical, ready for a variety of purposes.
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Alongside these administrative techniques of citizen 
manufacture we must, of course, locate more direct techni­
ques aimed at the formation of the citizenry—that is, par­
ticular direct forms of citizen training (especially in the field 
of education). For example, in the west, attempts to develop 
literate populations through the techniques of mass educa­
tion were at first tied to a desire to guarantee the piety of 
the individual. Over the last 100 years or so, however, the 
instilling of literacy into the population has become linked, 
rather, to a different double aim. The first aim is to try to 
allow the citizen to develop his or her potential to the full. 
The second is, as Ian Hunter has argued (ALR136), to train 
individuals to take up specific social and economic roles in 
society at large. We would argue that this double aim has 
managed to remain intact despite the fact that these aims 
often pull in opposite directions, as Hunter has outlined.
However, when citizenship is considered as a tool of 
government the distinction between the governor and the 
governed starts to become blurred. Citizens are expected to 
be both governors of themselves, and at the same time, 
objects of government. This is how they are both objects 
and devices of government. The examples we have offered 
so far bear this out.
Again, in being a tool of government, citizenship is (as we 
hinted above) widely taken by its supporters to be an ideal, 
something to be achieved and something worth achieving. 
This appears to cut across our notion of citizenship as a
technical device of government—it suggests that the tech­
nology must serve only 'good' democracy and its ideals, 
whereas we are suggesting it may serve any political 
project. This, as we shall outline below, is one of the reasons 
for dampening our expectations of the benefits of citizen­
ship for the particular political aims of, for instance, social 
democrats.
So far so good for citizenship and government. The picture 
we have painted suggests government working well using 
citizenship as one of its key devices. In the remainder of 
this article we aim to unsettle this picture of smooth ef­
ficiency. Consider, first, our previous idea that citizenship 
is an ideal and the proposition that this cuts across our 
notion of technical citizenship.
As a technical device of government, citizenship involves 
training people to understand citizenship as a good thing, 
a 'natural' way of behaving for advanced, civilised beings. 
Hence the technical nature of citizenship actually contains 
the ideal of citizenship, and the claims about it as an ideal 
are meaningless. Such claims have no grounds beyond this 
technical realm. Furthermore, this means citizenship can 
be equally well claimed as an ideal by any governmental 
system across the political spectrum. Fascists, communists 
and social democrats can each use the technical device of 
citizenship for their own ends if they each put in the 
necessary work. And each use will inevitably (if it is done 
properly) produce, as part of its technical operation,
The world of work is no longer so simple. 
Global forces and new technology are accelerating change. 
Unions are amalgamating. Women are asserting their ability. 
Young people are assessing their options.
To find out what's happening (and what might happen next) politicians, 
people in the media and union leaders in Australia turn to Workplace, 
the bright new quarterly magazine from the ACTU. 
Workplace, where work takes first place.
Take out an annual Workplace subscription (4 issues) now by posting a cheque for $20 to:
Workplace - the ACTU magazine  
c /o  2 2 0  Clarendon Street 
East Melbourne 300 2
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citizens who see this use as an ideal. In other words, all 
claims about citizenship as an ideal should be treated with 
equal scepticism.
The point is that citizenship is not an automatic good 
deriving its goodness from some aspect of human nature 
to do with collective behaviour. Our scepticism here is 
supported by the practices of the ancient Greeks who 
actually invented the notion of citizenship. For them it was 
not an automatic good, but rather a technical invention 
used to achieve and to cement the outcome of a contest in 
which certain city states, particularly Athens, were vic­
torious over other city states. These Greeks used the tech­
niques of citizenship in their victory, in producing the 
personnel necessary for that victory; only subsequently did 
the idea of citizenship become an ideal. Because it is so 
widely seen as an ideal, an automatic good, the exclusion­
ary character of citizenship is often overlooked. Citizen­
ship entails membership of a particular community. 
Membership means, by definition, some persons must be 
excluded. All communities exclude certain categories from 
citizenship—whether women, children, slaves, the proper- 
tyless, prisoners, or foreigners (including the 'guest 
workers' of modern Sweden and Germany).
In other words, if activists are to consider citizenship an 
ideal, as many on the Left seem to, they should not conflate 
it with the ideal of inclusion (such as membership of par­
ticular communities or associations), as so often happens. 
This is to misunderstand the very nature of citizenship. 
Connected to this point, certain expectations of citizens as 
ideal subjects and objects of government may be complete­
ly unrealistic. We have in mind, particularly, expectations 
to do with tolerance of diversity associated with the institu­
tions and beliefs of multiculturalism (discussed by Barry 
Hindess in ALR 140). One expectation of multiculturalism 
seems to be that good citizens will celebrate ethnic diver­
sity as a desirable feature of citizenship—and that if they 
don't celebrate it, ethinc diversity may become ethnic con­
flict and tear apart governemnt programmes like mulitcul- 
turalism.
It seems to us that this is a reasonable expectation of only 
a few highly trained citizens, and only at some times. In 
periods of extended peace, for instance, it may be possible 
to overcome the exclusionary character of citizenship and 
train a fair number of citizens to tolerate or even celebrate 
diversity. But in times of intermittent war (meaning the 
entire 20th century for most modern western countries), it 
is too much to expect more than a handful of citizens to 
overlook the exclusion which is a feature of citizenship in 
times of war. In wartime, a mark of good citizenship is to 
recognise the enemy as the definitely excluded enemy and to 
behave accordingly (there are extreme punishments for 
those who do not). It is a big step from here to celebrating 
diversity and concentrating on inclusion, especially when 
the step back is potentially always just around the corner.
These, then, are the problems which exclusion poses for 
citizenship seen as an ideal for 'good' politics. Moreover, 
these are underpinned by a difficulty with the sophistica­
tion of the citizen-forming administrative techniques we 
Pointed to earlier. Administrative techniques which pro­
vide the necessary background for modern citizenship 
(identifying needs for governments and beginning to ad­
dress them) are so sophisticated nowadays that they can 
analyse a body of citizens in terms of thousands, possibly 
millions, of different variables, including habits and at­
titudes. Identifying these variables and suggesting ways to 
begin to address them is one thing. Changing citizens by 
training them in (for instance) different habits or attitudes 
is a much slower and more difficult process.If this is the 
case, citizenship will not only struggle to serve as an ade­
quate tool in the situations where the problem of exclusion 
rears its head—it will prove inadequate in many more 
situations. In other words, the sophisticated administrative 
knowledge techniques may be producing false expecta­
tions of what citizenship can deliver as a tool of govern­
ment.
Another problem for modern citizenship is the sheer 
weight of numbers of citizens in the modern world. When 
citizenship was invented in ancient Athens it was never 
applied to more than 45,000 persons. Using citizenship as 
a governing device for only a small minority of persons 
resident in a community remained the norm right up to the 
modern era. But the modern era has involved both massive 
urbanisation and a dramatic increase in the sophistication 
and spread of calculation and assessment techniques. As a 
result the device of citizenship has come to be applied to a 
much, much higher proportion of residents of modern 
nations. The end result may not only be the fact that the 
newer type of citizenship (with its greater stress on self- 
government) differs markedly from the type used in the 
ancient world and the Renaissance. It may also be that the 
newer form doesn't work very well.
Finally, one reason modern citizenship doesn't work very 
well as a device of government might be because of resis­
tance on the part of persons formed as citizens themsel­
ves—an irrational resistance both to being governed and 
to being governors. Perhaps there will always be too many 
citizens—for reasons which rational thought will never 
capture—who will not take the responsibility of citizen­
ship seriously enough for it to bear the weight put on it by 
many of its advocates.
It is, of course, very easy to point to failures of citizenship 
as a governmental device. Yet the over-riding commitment 
by modern governments to the forms of government we've 
outlined in this piece (and in our last piece in ALR 141) 
suggests that such failures are virtually irrelevant. We need 
to do two things when thinking about government and 
citizenship. First, we need to think outside the concept of 
citizenship, to think beyond this 'necessary' governmental 
device, to examine the many instances of government 
where officials persist with techniques in the face of their 
blatant failure. And second, we need to lower our expecta­
tions about what citizenship can accomplish in the modern 
state.
GARY W ICKHAM teaches in social sciences at M urdoch 
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After Social
DEMOCRACY
In an era of shattered utopias, social democracy is one of 
the few political philosophies left standing. 
David Burchell argues that it might form the basis of a 
new, post-social democratic strategy.
he 80s was a graveyard of doctrines. 
Not just Soviet-style socialism, but 
also the whole idea of a 'system 
change', of a successor to capitalism 
waiting to be born, finally passed away, as its 
death notice might put it, 'after a long illness'. In 
this era of shattered utopias and a generalised 
scaling-down of expectations, social democracy, 
it seems, is one of the few among the major politi­
cal ideologies to retain at least a semblance of its 
credibility.
Postwar social democracy's stress on equality rather than 
ownership as the major preoccupation of reforming 
government, its insistence on democratic means and its 
robust contempt for the revolutionary mystique and all its 
works, have stood the test of time remarkably well. 
Moreover, as it becomes increasingly difficult to sum up
exactly what it is that modern Labor reformism 'stands for', 
the blend of idealistic ends and pragmatic means which 
distinguishes postwar social democracy from its com­
petitors on Left and Right may seem on the face of it 
peculiarly well-attuned to the times. So let's hear two 
cheers for social democracy.
Why not three, you may well ask? And why, nevertheless, 
do I feel such ambivalence about the project and, yes, the 
temper of postwar social democracy? I suspect that I'm not 
alone in this. Postwar social democracy was always con­
troversial: in postwar left-of-centre parties like the ALP, 
after all, it marked one side of the divide in the Cold War 
in the labour movement. Social democrats, it was tacitly 
understood, were those who in the last resort favoured 
liberal democracy over socialism, and who in the last resort 
backed Washington against Moscow, while socialists were 
those who held liberal democracy in less esteem than the 
supposed democratising capacity of socialism, and who in 
the final analysis were inclined (albeit with all sorts of 
qualifications and circumlocutions) to back Moscow
T
ALR: SEPTEMBER 1992
FEATURES 25
against Washington. To describe oneself as a social 
democrat was in these circumstances to pull on one's team 
colours in a serious and very bitter political slugging- 
match.
Again, postwar social democracy in countries like Australia 
has been controversial in that, while having its roots in the 
vague labourist-socialist ethos of the anglo-saxon labour 
movements, it explicitly, and even dismissively, rejected 
much of that same ethos. Prior to the theoretical social 
democracy of British Labour thinker and politician Tony 
Crosland—the key figure in postwar 'anglo-saxon' social 
democracy—it had been an implicit assumption of both 
anglo-saxon labourism and marxian socialism that the 
measuring-rod for the advance of labour vis-a-vis capital 
was the size of the public sector in the economy as a whole. 
Postwar social democracy rejected that belief out of hand— 
and in that, in my opinion, it has decisively been proven 
right But in so doing it started the process of unravelling 
that amalgam of instincts which comprised 'traditional 
Labor values'—a process which has gone much further in 
recent years in the Hawke-Keating government and in 
similar, nominally social democratic, governments in 
Western Europe and elsewhere. It was social democracy, in 
other words, which set off the political vertigo and loss of 
direction which mark the reforming condition of our own 
age.
Yet nowadays one thing is clear: social democracy no longer 
feels novel, let alone controversial. On the contrary, it now 
(ironically) feels like precisely that amalgam of unstated 
labour movement assumptions which comprises our own 
contemporary definition of 'traditional Labor values'—in 
effect a label for the theoretical and ethical status quo of the 
immediate past But, unless I miss my guess it's not just its 
lack of novelty which is the problem here. Social 
democracy, both as a doctrine and as an ethos, has evidently 
lost its capacity to inspire, to excite. It has also, and not 
unrelatedly, lost its capacity to mark out a strategic territory, 
to prepare a map of action, for the labour movement in 
particular and the wider and more diffuse reforming con­
stituency in general.
This may seem to suggest that social democracy is a thing 
of the past, yet another part of the political baggage of the 
century of disappointments to be cast off in the search for 
new political themes for the new century. I don't think so; 
rather, as I hinted above, it seems to me that the values and 
several of the guiding precepts of postwar social democracy 
are important links between the philosophy of the postwar 
labour movement and the new political ethos of our own 
age. Dennis Altman a few years ago called for a 
'reconstituted social democracy'. The somewhat laboured 
verb seems to me to highlight the problem: who nowadays 
could be cheerfully and enthusiastically gathered to the 
task of 'reconstituting' social democracy? Perhaps a more 
plausible project is a post-social democracy: a doctrine 
which tries to 'go beyond' the malaise of the actual proce­
dures and practices of traditional social democracy, while 
at the same time readily aligning itself with important 
aspects of the ethos of that tradition. To adapt a phrase from 
Ernesto Laclau, post-social democracy would be post-social 
democracy, but it would also decidedly be post social
democratic in temper—it would come out of, and be in­
formed by that tradition.
In order to envisage how to 'go beyond' social democracy, 
however, it's necessary to understand precisely what it is, 
or was—what precisely constituted its air of novelty, and 
what were its sources of intellectual inspiration. The forma­
tive setting for postwar social democracy was the immedi­
ate postwar world, though of course its major reference 
points were the 30s Depression and World War Two. This 
context informed the new social democracy in two ways: in 
terms of its techniques, practices and 'art' of government, 
and in terms of its theoretical reference points. At the 
theoretical level the 30s had demonstrated to those who 
became the postwar social democrats that neither tradition­
al instinctual labourism nor the then-fashionable mechani­
cal marxism of the radical Left possessed the theoretical 
wherewithal to provide a practical programmatic response 
to the evident economic and social problems of capitalism.
Labourism, the traditional ethos of the labour movement, 
was in effect anti-theoretical; it held that the prime goal of 
the labour movement was to strengthen the power of the 
labour movement—the assumption being that a stronger 
labour movement would be in a better position to protect 
its constituents. Yet about what to do when the labour 
movement was in power labourism had remarkably little 
to say. In consequence the records of Australian and British 
labour governments in the Depression was mostly one of 
confused and meek acceptance of the status quo. The mar­
xism of the radical Left, meanwhile, certainly did not lack 
a theory, but of course its guiding logic was that there had 
of necessity to be an apocalyptic change in politics, society 
and economy; by no means short of that would the deficien­
cies of the capitalist economy be remedied. Social 
democracy argued that on the contrary it was possible to 
have a theoretically consistent plan of action which insisted 
on the possibility of real and indeed irreversible change to 
capitalism short of social catastrophe.
At the governmental level the problem was rather similar. 
Labourism, in the absence of an alternative model of 
government, had been forced to rely on a half-hearted 
commitment to the logic of governance of economic 
liberalism as its raison d'etre in the 30s, with disastrous 
consequences. Marxism founded its conception of gover­
nance on Marx's conviction in the hopeless anarchy of the 
market, and on the leninist belief in the efficacy of planning 
in a non-market economy. Social democracy broke this 
impasse. It saw that there were two key techniques avail­
able to postwar governments which enabled them to 
manipulate both economy and society, without the neces­
sity for a recourse to the edicts of liberalism on the one hand 
or of an increasingly hypothetical insurrectionism on the 
other. In the realm of social policy this new technique went 
by the name of 'the welfare state'; in the realm of economic 
policy the rubric was 'Keynesianism'.
Of course, the new social democrats 'invented' neither the 
welfare state nor practical Keynesianism: both were techni­
ques of government which had been introduced to some 
limited extent-prior to World War Two, and then in much
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more fullblown form during and immediately after the war. 
The novel role of social democrats in the 50s and 60s was 
to argue that these twin techniques of government enabled 
government to supervise and manipulate the capitalist 
economy and society in ways which previous 'arts' of 
government had thought impossible, and to conclude from 
this that this enabled social democrats to make fundamen­
tal and irreversible changes to capitalism within the mode 
of government—liberal democracy—proper to capitalism 
itself. Or, in Tony Crosland's words in his 1956 The Future 
of Socialism, 'the government can exert any influence it likes 
on income distribution, and can also determine within 
broad limits the division of total output between consump­
tion, investment, exports, and social expenditure'.
The significance of this Croslandite argument on the 
reforming strategy of government was profound. It was 
'now quite clear', claimed Crosland in 1952, 'that 
capitalism has not the strength to resist the process of 
metamorphosis into a qualitatively different kind of. 
society'; and again, he contended, 'by 1951 Britain had, in 
all essentials, ceased to be a capitalist country'. Yet this new 
social state—which he referred to, significantly, as 'welfare 
statism'—was not in itself the goal towards which social 
democrats were heading. Neither 'the continued extension 
of free social services' nor the 'continued proliferation of 
controls', nor 'further redistribution of income by direct 
taxation' would in themselves get to that goal. Rather, they 
provided the governmental capacity to advance to social 
democracy by eradicating 'the sense of class', enabling a 
'partnership in industry' and effecting a cultural transfor­
mation: 'We need not only higher exports and old-age 
pensions, but more open-air cafes, brighter and gayer 
streets at night, later closing hours for public houses, 
brighter and cleaner eating-houses, more riverside cafes, 
more pleasure gardens...more murals and pictures in 
public places...and so on ad infinitum.'
In its day this was a heady brew: a hard-headed and 
strategic view of the quite radical possibilities of govern­
ment allied to a wholly new agenda of social reform unfet­
tered by the old trench warfare of marxist-labourist 'class 
politics'. Its influence was deep, if not immediate; most 
thinking social democrats in the 60s and 70s were in effect 
Croslandites, whether they realised it or not—and Gough 
Whitlam was an eminently Croslandite leader of the ALP. 
Indeed when the twentieth anniversary of Whitlam's assec- 
csion to the prime ministership comes about later this year, 
it will be towards Croslandite-W hitlamite social 
democracy that much of the nostalgia will in effect be 
directed.
The reason is not difficult to understand. After all, the 
unstated premise behind the current liberal-social 
democratic revulsion against 'economic rationalism' is that 
there was another period, the 'Whitlam years', when 
nominally social democratic government had a raison d'etre 
and a conception of government of its own, and was not 
apparently parasitic on notions of the limits of government 
derived from classical economic liberalism. And it certainly 
would be difficult to define the Hawke-Keating years as 
'social democratic' in temper; the modern Labor 'art of 
government' is at once too market-orientated and too novel
in its blend of the interventionist (training, education) and 
the non-interventionist (industry policy, the financial sys­
tem) to be subsumed within the accepted rubric of postwar 
social democracy.
Yet of course the story doesn't (or didn't) have a happy 
ending. The Whitlam government doesn't in fact provide a 
model for a revived social democratic ethos; on the con­
trary, as the current Labor government is only too well 
aware, it appears to provide an object lesson in how Cros­
landite social democracy failed utterly to cope with the new 
social and economic crises of the 70s and after. Nor were 
the problems of Whitlamite politics simply the failings of a 
particular individual or a particular government. Rather, 
their origins lay in several important founding assump­
tions of Croslandite-Whitlamite social demcoracy itself. In 
essence there were three crucial problems with Croslandite 
social democracy which have asserted themselves in the 
new political context of the 70s and after.
most thinking social 
democrats in the 60s and 
70s were in effect 
Croslandites’
The first is its excessively optimistic view of the capacity of 
the state both to guide economic policy more narrowly and 
the 'strategy of equality' more broadly. As Barry Hindess 
has elsewhere noted, Crosland's belief in the capacity of the 
government 'to exert any influence it likes' on macro- 
economic outcomes and income distribution was disputed 
at the time both by the marxist Left and the liberal Right. 
Nowadays it seems positively antique. We tend to take for 
granted, for instance, that in the contemporary liberalised 
world economy the capacity of national govenrment to 
adjust policy settings in defiance of international trends is 
extremely limited.
Again, of course, there is now quite sufficient statistical and 
other evidence, both from Australia and overseas, to sug­
gest that simply having the will to do so is hardly sufficient 
to influence the distribution of income in society to any 
marked extent. Rather, even when it has been the express 
intention of governments to do so, social inequality over 
the last decade had become markedly more pronounced. 
The reasons for this are obviously too complex to go into 
here, but one is of particular relevance to the immediate 
argument. The picture given by Croslandite social 
democracy of the 'machinery of government' was rather 
like that of a Bruce Petty cartoon: there are levers and 
pulleys everywhere; each lever connects to a pulley, and 
each lever pulled activates a different outcome.
One thing that seems clear now is that the activity of 
government is far more complex, and indeed contradictory, 
than this model allows. Policy actions often (maybe even 
usually) produce outcomes which are not strictly predict­
able, and which are very often in conflict with the outcomes 
of equally well-intentioned policy actions in related fields.
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The picture we have nowadays of the activity of govern­
ment is rather of a process of puzzled experimentation, and 
of an inclination not to rock society's boat too much too 
quickly for fear that it may lead to unpredictable conse­
quences.
This leads neatly to the second problem of Croslandite 
social democracy. For the problem of social democratic 
governance is not simply a matter of government having 
become too complex to allow of adequate 'planning'. The 
problem is a deeper one; indeed, it goes to the heart of the 
Croslandite conception of the relationship between the 
state and civil society. And the mechanical metaphor I 
invoked above is at least part of the key. The British social 
thinker David Marquand has described the problemnicely:
Despite the humanity and generosity of its founders, 
[social democracy] degenerated, in practice, into a 
system of social engineering. The engineers could 
pull the levers in the knowledge that the machine 
would respond as they wishecL.Sorial democrats 
wanted to do good, but they were more anxious to 
do good to others than to help others do good to 
themselves. As they saw it, the role of public inter­
vention was to provide, to manipulate, or to instruct, 
rather than to empower...Hand in hand with all this 
went a curiously simplistic attitude to the state and 
to the relationship between the state and the web of 
intermediate institutions and volutary associations 
which make up a civil society. The state was seen as 
an instrument (or set of instruments) which social 
demcoratic ministers could use as they wished. Civil 
society was seen, all too often, not as an agent but as 
a patient: as an inert body, lying on an operating 
table, undergoing social democratic surgery.
Seen from this vantage-point, then, the problem of Cros­
landite social democracy is not just a governmental prob­
lem, a problem of technique. It is also a political problem: 
a problem of consent. One of the most sobering lessons of 
the Croslandite-Whitlamite experience has been that 
society, in Marquand's terms, is not just a patient on an 
operating table; society (in Marquand's words) 'has a mind 
(or minds) of its own'. This is a lesson which neo-liberalism 
has well-appreciated, and which was close to the heart of 
Thatcherism and Reaganism in the 80s.
However, this is only part—albeit a crucial part—of the 
political problem. Another part, as Crosland himself had 
realised by the early 70s, is that social democratic objectives 
'require a redistribution of wealth and resources: and we 
shall not get this unless our total resources are growing 
rapidly'. For, as is now commonly conceded, the postwar 
historic compromise' upon which modern social 
democracy was founded implicitly agreed that redistirub- 
tion was politically feasilbe insofar as it was the fruits of 
strong economic growth which were being redistributed, 
rather than the existing incomes of ordinary working 
People. As Crosland insisted: 'In a utopia (or a dictator­
ship) perhaps we might transfer x percent of near-static 
^NP towards pensioners and better housing and clearing 
J?P pollution. In the rough democratic world in which we 
live, we cannot'.
A large part of the tragedy of Croslandite social democracy 
lay in this dilemma; for while social democracy was cru­
cially dependent on the continuance of strong economic 
growth as the political underpininng of its social strategy, 
it was precisely that strong economic growth which it took 
for granted in its analysis of society, and in which it took 
the least policy interest. Here again the outstanding ex­
ample was the 'Whitlam years': a social democratic 
government with an ambitious social agenda ran aground 
on economic problems which it was unable to com­
prehend, let alone solve. And because it was unable to 
comprehend the nature of those problems it gave the 
strong political impression of having no interest in them— 
an impression which quickly became electorally fatal.
This is the part of the story which most appeals to partisans 
of the current Labor government—and they are certainly 
right to insist on its importance. It is true, as Paul Keating 
and Bill Kelty have argued, that one needs to have an 
understanding of how to generate growth before one can 
hope to win political consent for redistributing it  It is 
similarly true that in a time of structural economic crisis 
the old social priorities of social democracy may have to be 
displaced by the more immediate concern of building an 
economic platform from which sustainable growth is once 
again possible. All of this is true—but it does not repel the 
reasonable criticism that in discarding 70s social 
democracy contemporary Labor has left itself with no clear 
'art of government' other than that derived from neo­
liberalism, no obvious social strategy, and no clear concep­
tion of the goals and values of reforming government. It is 
here that the need for a post-social democracy I outlined 
above becomes pressing.
How would such a post social democracy define itself? 
First, it would have a new conception of the relationship 
between a social-democratic state and society. In short, it 
would see itself less as directing or 'planning', and more 
as 'enabling' and 'facilitating'—broadly along the lines of 
the 'associative' model Paul Hirst outlines elsewhere in 
this issue. Second, it would take that understanding of the 
state into economic policy, and particularly into industry 
policy, where it would be less interested in 'picking 
winners' than in creating the right environment, encourag­
ing cooperation between firms, and providing necessary 
information and support—all the techniques, in fact, of the 
new wave of industry policy. Finally, it would of necessity 
adapt the values and principles of social democratic social 
policy—greater equality of income, of access, of oppor­
tunity—to the more complex contemporary under­
standing of a pluralistic society with its own demands and 
priorities. Such a model would still be identifiably social 
democratic in temper, even if it was far in governmental 
technique from the old vision of Tony Crosland and Gough 
Whitlam. But that in itself might not be a bad thing.
D A VID  BURCHELL is the editor of ALR. He once wrote a 
doctoral thesis about another B ritish  social dem ocratic 
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FIN DE
Siecle
In the aftermath of the Cold War the shape of world 
politics is in a state o f flux. How should we interpret the 
new face of the post-communist epoch? Stan Correy spoke 
to Fred Halliday about his views on the Gulf War in 
retrospect, the 'end of history', and the precarious state of 
democracy in the fin de siecle world.
F red Halliday is professor of interna­tional relations at the London School of Economics. He is the author of 
numerous books on international 
relations, including The Second Cold War (Verso).
You surprised a lot of your left-wing colleagues by sup­
porting the UN intervention in the 1991 Gulf War. What 
was the background to your position on the war?
The war started because Iraq was in trouble. They'd fought 
Iran for eight years, ending in 1988, and had very little to 
show for it. They'd lost a large number of men, and most 
Iraqis knew that Saddam had started the war. In addition, 
Iraq faced very serious economic problems. These were in 
part caused by the fact that Kuwait and Abu Dhabi were 
producing more oil than their OPEC quotas allowed. This 
was pushing down the price of oil, and as a result was 
depriving Iraq of the oil revenue it needed to rebuild. In 
that situation Saddam said: 'we're going to teach these
parasites a lesson'. I think he had considerable support in 
Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world for teaching the
oil-rich states a lesson. And he believed the Arab world 
would accept the fait accompli.
So, in one sentence, Saddam thought he could solve the 
problems of Iraq by basically robbing his neighbour—and 
by posing as the champion of the Arab world in the 
process. He didn't succeed and he was stopped. Now, 
many people said there could have been an alternative 
solution. Saddam could have been gotten out of Kuwait by 
Arab diplomacy. I don't believe there ever was such a 
possibility. An Arab solution was no solution. They also 
said sanctions could have worked. Sanctions certainly 
were not given time, but I don't believe they could have 
worked, for two reasons. First, the Middle East is very 
porous: Iraq has open borders with Turkey and Syria. They 
could have imported necessary goods for a long time to 
maintain their infrastructure and to meet some important 
technological needs of the regime. Second, they wouldn't 
have worked because sanctions only work against nice
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people. They work against governments which are not 
willing to inflict great suffering on their own people—like 
Salvador Allende in Chile. The Iraqi regime has no such 
compunction about its own people, as it showed after the 
war. They would have let the population starve and 
blamed it on the West, as they blamed subsequent 
problems on the West.
So the real choice in the Gulf was this. Do you let Saddam 
stay in Kuwait, or do you evict him by force? In those 
circumstances I favoured evicting him by force. I think 
there is a good argument against the Gulf War. But that 
argument involves saying that Saddam should have 
stayed in Kuwait: that the price of getting him out was too 
high—too high in terms of human life, too high in terms of 
American domination, too high in terms of Western inter­
vention in the Third World. Therefore, he should have been 
allowed to stay. But to say that peace wasn't given a chance, 
or that there was another solution, is self-deception. There 
was no other solution to get him out of Kuwait.
Saddam thought people didn't like the rulers of Saudi 
Arabia or Kuwait, who were seen as greedy sheikhs. But 
a lot of people in the West also thought: why bother about 
them, what have they done for us?
The ruling family in Kuwait, the A1 Sabah family, is a tribal 
oligarchy. They rule with some concessions to the popula­
tion, but basically they keep power and they keep the 
money for themselves. But having said that, it's 
preferable—as most people in Kuwait thought—to be 
ruled by them than to be ruled by Saddam Hussein's 
government, which also took the money for itself, and was 
far more repressive than anything in Kuwait. Second, if 
there was going to be a change in Kuwait, it should have 
come about through the actions of the Kuwaiti people 
themselves. For me the clinching argument in the whole 
affair was that the Kuwaiti opposition itself opposed the 
Iraqi intervention. They favoured military action, not in 
order to restore the royal family, but to restore the 
sovereignty of Kuwait, so that they could get on with the 
job of trying to change the country—something they're 
busy now doing in the elections.
There's a lot of nonsense talked by people who say that 
because the royal family were undemocratic rulers, 
Kuwait should not have existed as a state. There are plenty 
of countries with dictatorial regimes, but it doesn't mean 
that people don't have the right to their own country. 
Moreover, many of the people who suffered most during 
the war were people who suffered at Saddam's hands. 
Hundreds of thousands of people were expelled from 
Kuwait in appalling circumstances by Saddam after 2 
August, 1991, and distributed all over the Middle East. 
Particularly badly treated were the non-Arabs—people 
from Sri Lanka, from the Philippines, from the Tamil areas 
of India—who were thrown out by Saddam in a complete­
ly merciless way, on the grounds that they weren't Arabs. 
I think we tend to forget what that occupation meant. So 
faced with the dictatorship of the A1 Sabah oligarchs or 
Saddam's military intervention, I still think that on 
humanitarian grounds the A1 Sabah were preferable. And 
so does virtually all the population of Kuwait.
Now people may say: so what? The 'so what?', beyond the 
question of oil, is the democratic principle itself. The 
United States may well have intervened for the wrong 
reasons—they also fought against Japan and against Nazi 
Germany in the Second World War for the wrong 
reasons—but what they did had certain positive conse­
quences, which were to stop one state being gobbled up by 
another. If the choice is fascism or imperialism, as it was in 
the Second World War, I'll choose imperialism with my 
eyes open. And I think that was the choice in the Gulf War.
Critics of the war, like Noam Chomsky for example, 
argue that the Gulf War was basically a classic example 
of US imperialism. Wasn't it simply a case of America 
throwing its weight around simply to protect its dearly 
beloved oil?
I would concede that in some respects America was throw­
ing its weight around—not just against the Arab world, as 
George Bush saw it, but also against its major rivals in 
Europe and Japan. But the fact is that it didn't succeed. I 
challenge anybody to show me how America's bargaining 
position vis-a-vis the Common Market or Japan in trade 
negotiations, or in GATT, has been altered one per cent by 
what it did in the war.
Chomsky and the critics of American foreign policy are 
basically concerned with criticising the lies and 
hypocrisies in America's moral position. I would agree 
with them on this. But that does not mean that everything 
America does should be opposed. And I would add to this 
a second consideration, which I don't think Chomsky 
comprehends. Throughout the Third World many people 
fighting for various forms of democratisation and 
liberalisation look to the better side of America to do 
something for them—even if for the wrong reasons.
The PLO, for instance, are not saying that everything 
America does is dreadful. Rather, they're saying live up to 
your rhetoric, get on and support national self-determina­
tion, do in the Arab-Israeli context what you did in the 
Kuwait context. And, to Baker and Bush's credit, they've 
got on and tried to do it. Likewise, when Nelson Mandela 
went to the US Congress he said: Thank you for the sanc­
tions you imposed on South Africa in 1986 which helped 
to change de Klerk's mind; now do more to encourage the 
peace process in South Africa. So the question is not 
whether everything America does is for pure motives, or 
whether everything America does is right. Under some 
circumstances it can assist the process of national self- 
determination. I think the critics are misreading the objec­
tive consequences, if not the subjective motives of 
American action by this, as it were, off-the-shelf critique.
You argue that not only critics of the war, but even George 
Bush, misread its significance.
They certainly saw it as more important than it was. First 
of all, there's no such thing as a New World Order; it's an 
ad-man's phrase. Bush himself doesn't use the phrase any 
more. So far as it meant anything, it meant that the Soviet 
Union and the United States would work together to
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resolve some Third World problems: Namibia, El Salvador, 
and at least the beginnings of a Cambodian solution. Of 
course in other places, such as Afghanistan, they made a 
complete mess of it
Chomsky says the New World Order means America tram­
pling all over the world, dominating the world and playing 
the world policeman. The fact is, it hasn't played the world 
policeman. The Europeans and the Japanese are not being
‘The fact is, America hasn’t 
played the world 
policeman. ’
pushed around by the Americans. The American public 
itself has shown much greater pacific—not pacifist—in­
stincts than most critics of American foreign policy gave it 
credit for. And the United States is now extremely reluctant 
to intervene anywhere—though I have my doubts whether 
they wouldn't intervene in Cuba if there's a crisis there.
In short, the Gulf War has not led to a new period of 
imperialism. It was not exactly a sideshow, but it was a 
secondary side-road on the evolution of the international 
system since the end of the Cold War. It hasn't set prece­
dents—except for the precedent, which I happen to en­
dorse, that bigger states should not gobble up little states.
Yet the term New World Order, ad-man's phrase though 
it may be, is still used quite a lot in trying to come to terms 
with how American foreign policy is being carried out 
throughout the world.
I'm not sure that the term New World Order is still being 
used by anyone except the critics of American foreign 
policy; in other words those who wish to impose on it a 
consistency and a coherence which I don't think it has. 
Having said that, we are in a new international situation— 
one which concerns, among other things, America's power 
and what it does with it. That does raise a number of 
important questions, but they're not ones encapsulated by 
a 'new world order'—not least because we don't have a 
new international order, we have a new international dis­
order. And that's something which the Americans on their 
own certainly aren't going to solve, even if they were able 
to.
Before the Gulf crisis it was the Palestinian issue which 
had dominated Middle East politics for so long. Has the 
coining together of the Arabs and Israelis to talk about 
peace been a direct result of the war?
The decision by the Americans to put so much effort into 
getting talks going, and the willingness of the Israelis and 
Palestinians to talk, was in part a result of the Gulf War. It 
underlined the extent to which the Middle East is 
dominated by the Palestinian question; not because it's the
only question, but it is a central part of the problem, and 
things will not be solved elsewhere if there is no solution 
to that problem.
Other factors contributed to it. I think the Israelis feel, as 
indeed a number of other countries throughout the world 
feel, that the end of the Cold War has removed a protector 
from them. And certainly the strategic ground has moved 
under Israel's feet. The factor which has most affected the 
Americans, however, is that the Gulf War underlined the 
extent to which the developed world depends on Gulf oil 
for its economic lifeblood. As long as people drive motor 
cars they're going to need oil. And while there is some other 
oil around in the world, most of it in the future is going to 
be obtained from the Middle East. And in that sense, they 
intervened militarily to secure access to it: not to own it, to 
secure access to it. And they have moved on the Arab-Israeli 
question precisely to try to increase the probability of 
stability in the region. I don't think they've achieved it, and 
I think that's in part because the lessons of the Gulf War 
have not been learned.
Lesson number one is that if you play politics with the price 
of oil, you play politics with the stability of the region. The 
price of oil is too low at the moment and may lead to friction 
between oil-rich and less oil-rich states. The lesson that 
should have been learned is that a stable, but somewhat 
higher price of oil is a guarantor of long-term stability in 
the region.
Second, the security of the Gulf rests not just on a coalition 
of some Arab states, but on a coalition of the Arab states 
and Iran. Yet the Americans have excluded the Iranians, 
who are getting more and more confident, and at the same 
time more and more angry. If the Iranians start an arms race, 
then the Arabs are going to start an arms race, and the result 
is going to be greater instability.
But the most important lesson they didn't learn concerns 
democracy. The issue of democracy lay at the heart of the 
Iraq-Kuwait dispute. Why? Because on the Iraqi side you 
have a dictatorial regime which rests upon theatrical and 
dangerous foreign gestures to keep up its momentum and 
legitimacy. On the Kuwaiti side—and this is a point often 
overlooked—the Kuwaiti government was resisting pres­
sure for democratisation. They thought they could play a 
game of hard-line poker with Iraq as a means of maintain­
ing a foreign threat to silence their domestic critics and to 
enable them to delegitimise them by calling them Iraqi 
agents. That's why the Kuwaiti government miscalculated 
so much in dealing with Iraq,
I don't believe Saddam was planning to invade Kuwait for 
six months beforehand. In the end he said: "I've had 
enough of negotiating with these people, I'm going to teach 
them a lesson, and I'll get away with it." Well, he did teach 
them a lesson, but it's not a lesson they seem to have learned 
for long. The lesson is that lack of democracy in the Gulf 
states is a contribution to instability.
The people who have learned the democratic lesson least 
are the Saudi Arabians, who are playing around with non­
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sense like 'special kinds of Islamic consultation' and so- 
called consensus in Islam. Frankly, these are just apologetic 
terms, like people who use terms like 'the different nature 
of Asian politics' to justify their own dictatorships. This is 
garbage. There are certain general, universal criteria for 
democracy. There are cultural variations—the British have 
their Queen, America everyone owns a handgun, and so 
on—but basically the criteria for democracy are the same. 
They're not being met in the Gulf, and this is another cause 
of instability, because the rulers are going to remain 
frightened of the ruled.
What about the Kurdish revolt after the Gulf War. What 
was the significance of that, the way it came about and 
the way it is resolving itself?
The great difference between Iraq's war with Iran and its 
war with America was that in the first war they were able 
to mobilise patriotic sentiment inside Iraq against the 
enemy. In the second war, much to the surprise of everyone 
outside, they were not able to mobilise great patriotic sup­
port against the Americans or against the Kuwaitis—even 
though initially people were glad that these rich, corrupt 
Kuwaitis had been taught a lesson. The result of that was 
that with the defeat in Kuwait, there was an insurrection 
inside the country.
But because of the limited nature of the Americans' destruc­
tion of Iraq's military potential, the Iraqi regime had the 
potential to put down this uprising, and the outside world 
did nothing. I have to say that they should have done 
something. Not so much because they gave false expecta­
tions to the Kurds that they would come in—they didn't. 
Rather they should have done something because this was 
a chance to get rid of Saddam, and a chance that was in 
keeping with the evident aspirations of the majority of the 
Iraqi people.
They didn't do so for reasons that are not entirely perni­
cious. In part, they didn't want to get into a situation of 
manufacturing a new political regime in Iraq. In part, they 
weren't sure whether some of the elements in revolt among 
the Shiites were preferable to Saddam—and given what 
such people have done in Iran, that's again an open ques­
tion. In part they didn't do so because they wanted to stick 
within the UN resolutions, which did not encompass, even 
at the most stretched interpretation, going into Iraq and 
getting rid of Saddam. But having said that, I think they 
should have done it. The uprising happened and Saddam 
defeated it, very bloodily. Many more people were killed in 
that uprising and its suppression than were killed in the 
war itself, certainly many more civilians. And it has certain­
ly meant that any of the other people planning an insurrec­
tion will think twice before doing so. So an opportunity was 
missed, and it was missed through a combination of 
timidity and legitimate scruple.
You've commented that it was "the T-shirt and not the 
gunboat" that destroyed the old Soviet Empire and broke 
down the resistance to global capitalism. Ronald Reagan 
would probably disagree with you; he would see 
America's tremendous arms build-up as having been the 
decisive factor. What did you mean by that?
I don't have much time for Ronald Reagan as a commen­
tator on international affairs. The simple explanation as to 
why the Soviet Union collapsed—one which is espoused 
both in the United States and in the former Soviet Union— 
is the arms race. The West, we are told, outspent them. I 
don't think that explains what happened, for a number of 
reasons. First of all, even if the Soviet Union spent 20% or 
25% of its GNP on military production, that doesn't explain 
the inefficiency of the rest of the economy. It doesn't explain 
why they couldn't harvest more than two-thirds of their 
crops, or the levels of inefficiency in the provision of con­
sumer goods. Moreover, it doesn't explain the lack of spin­
off between the military and civilian sectors, which you've 
got in the West. So the failure of the Soviet Union was not 
to do with the amount of money spent on military produc­
tion, but with the very structure of the economy, which was 
increasingly unable to grow, and increasingly unable to 
incorporate new forms of technology.
Where I think the arms race did have an effect was in the 
realisation by the Soviet military leadership—who after all 
were the core of the whole story—that not only could they 
not keep up with the West, but that they could never imitate 
the West Once you're talking about precision-guided rock­
ets and bombs, once you're talking about precision en­
gineering to a thousandth of a millimetre; they were into a 
league they could never compete in as they'd competed 
before. And that not only had military and security implica­
tions, it had ideological implications. It meant that the West 
was moving further and further away from them, and that 
they were never going to be able to overtake them. That 
demoralised them.
But beyond that, what demoralised them, and led people 
to abandon hope in communism, was the rise in consumer 
standards in the West, the growth of youth culture, all these 
things which affected the elite, their families, and the larger 
class of educated people who were created by the very 
successes of the Brezhnev period.
Added to which is one other fact: there was no halfway 
house, no third way. Dubcekism, 'socialism with a human 
face', was simply not a viable option for them in the 1980s, 
if it ever was. Gorbachev tried to find a middle way; it 
didn't work. The real pressure came not from Western 
military spending, but from the success of western con­
sumer society. And in that sense, the Common Market did 
as much to demoralise them as anything else.
Fukuyama's term 'the end of history' has been criticised 
by both Left and Right as an oversimplification. What do 
you believe the term means?
I have annoyed a lot of people by saying that to a consid­
erable extent I agree with Fukuyama. I agree with him to 
the extent that there has been a period of history—the 200 
years since the French Revolution—in which the western 
capitalist model of economy and politics has been chal­
lenged by an alternative, whether out of power or in power: 
an alternative in which people believed. Even strategies for 
radical Third World development which weren't explicitly 
communist—like Nasser's Egypt, Sukarno's Indonesia, or
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for that matter Khomeini's Iran—were parasitic on the 
communist belief that there was an alternative.
Fukuyama is saying there is no longer a global competitor. 
He is not saying that there aren't going to be wars, he's not 
saying that this is a perfect society—in facthe has some very 
interesting arguments as to why it's an imperfect and un­
stable society. But he is saying that there's no global alter­
native, and I agree with him. Communism after seventy 
years hasn't worked; it's discredited. It so happens that 1.4 
billion people in China and elsewhere are still ruled by 
Communism, but it looks like it's on the way out And I 
don't think that the Islamic movement in its political form 
is a challenge—not least because economically these 
societies are a disaster, and also because they greatly over­
estimate their ability to challenge the West The Islamic 
movements haven't been a challenge to the West since the 
battle of Lepanto in the early 16th century.
I also agree with Fukuyama when he says that we can make 
judgements about the progress of history. In other words, 
we don't have to simply say we don't know. We're sur­
rounded these days by what is loosely termed postmoder­
nism, which in my view is a kind of liberal 
feeble-mindedness. People say: We don't really know if we 
believe in this value or that value. There are no grand 
narratives in history. I think this leads to all sorts of perni­
cious consequences. And Fukuyama's saying: No. There 
are certain criteria by which we evaluate human progress. 
These are they. He's also right in saying something that 
liberals have a lot of problems in saying, particularly in the 
States—that the United States won the Cold War. Many 
Americans don't like to hear this; they say "Look at our 
schools and our roads. Look at crime; look at southern Los 
Angeles", and so on. First of all nobody ever won a war 
without costs. The Americans have won a war; of course 
they've paid a price for it. Second, to say that the US is in 
the same kind of trouble as the Soviet Union is plain silly. 
It's a solipsism. It's thought polite to say it, but it's simply 
not true.
However, I do think Fukuyama is wrong in several respects. 
First of all, what he doesn't acknowledge sufficiently is that 
the idea of an end of history itself has a history. And of 
course it isn't just Hegel or Marx; all the great religions have 
a belief in the end of history, in the coming of a Messiah or 
some kind of grand resolution. So it's part of an aspiration 
for something. And behind every idea of the end of history 
lies an idea of historical agency. In other words, who's 
bringing it about? It could be the Messiah, it could be the 
market, it could be the working class, it could be Reason, as 
Hegel believed. But Fukuyama won't acknowledge what 
his theory of agency is. And of course in his case it is ideas. 
He seems to think ideas solve history.
Yes, but many people on the Left, as well as a lot of 
liberals, worry that if you adopt Fukuyama's conviction 
that liberal capitalism has won, that means there's no 
other alternative. You've studied revolutionary move­
ments around the world for many years. Does this mean 
that you're saying there's no form of radical economic or 
social action possible any more, because capitalism's 
won, the market's won?
First of all, I don't think capitalism and the market are the 
same thing. I think that's a particular interpretation which 
Thatcher and Reagan put on events. But the success of 
capitalism in East Asia, like the success of British and 
German capitalism in the 19th century, didn't rely primarily 
on the market at all. It relied on state intervention, often of 
a quite coercive kind, to mobilise resources, channel educa­
tion, and so forth. I've just been in Singapore, where the 
success of capitalism certainly doesn't rely on the market. 
The two main agencies in Singapore are Singapore Airlines 
and the Port Authority—both of which are run by the state. 
So this equation of capitalism with the market is not some­
thing which equates with much of the history of capitalism.
Second, to say that liberal capitalism has won is not to say 
that that particular current definition of it is the only one. 
There is already a wide range of interpretations between, 
say, Sweden on the one hand and the United States on the 
other. There's an immense amount of variation there.
Third, there are new potentialities, both for the worse and 
for the better. There are trends in the international system 
which negatively affect the ability of democratic societies 
to survive even as they now do. I would include in that the 
lack of control over economic processes by governments, 
something you certainly see here in Australia, but also in 
Britain; increasing abilities for surveillance and monitoring 
offered by new technologies; and the new rise in 
chauvinism associated with the rise in migration. On the 
other hand, there are a whole range of areas where 
democracy can be enhanced. What I'm saying is that they 
can't be enhanced by Bolshevik-style revolution or Islamic 
revolution—by throwing everything out the window.
What I would stress is that there is no reason to think that 
this model is going to prevail, and here is my greatest 
difference with Fukuyama. First of all, we should remem­
ber that if one-person, one-vote is the criterion, then 
democracy didn't come to Britain or the United States until 
the late 1960s. Prior to that, in Northern Ireland and in the 
southern United States, there were quite a lot of dis­
enfranchised people. Democracy is in fact a very recent 
development. It's precarious, even in the most developed 
countries. And you can only be reasonably confident that 
it operates once it's been up and running for at least a 
generation. The Weimar republic had democracy, Liberia, 
Lebanon and Sri Lanka have all had democracy—yet it was 
taken away again. We're talking about at most a couple of 
dozen countries out of the 180 in the world who'd have 
secure democracies.
Given that fact, and given its precariousness, the greatest 
mistake is to be complacent about liberal democracy and to 
say that it has solved all human problems. It has not. You 
don't have to live in southern Los Angeles to see just how 
imperfect the system is. So, yes, radical, revolutionary al­
ternatives to it have failed, while it itself is both precarious 
and capable of both positive and negative development
STAN CORREY is a producer for ABC Radio National's 
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FUTURES
Market
We no longer have faith in the future. We're no longer 
even able to imagine a single future. Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger ponders a political method for an epoch 
without faith in historical destiny.
p
luralism spares nothing. The future 
too is not proof against it. As if it were 
self-evident, it is a singular noun in 
all natural languages, just like the 
past and the present, which most of us continue 
to believe only occur once. If, however, we think 
about what is in store for us, our heads grow 
dizzy. We have lost the capacity to subsume what 
is not yet there in the singular. In this sense we 
don't have too little future before us or even none 
at all, as the dusty slogan, No Future, would have 
us believe, but too much, which is to say: too 
many. The future has become unthinkable as an 
homogeneous idea. Every consideration which is 
devoted to it, splits in the manner of an endlessly 
proliferating flow diagram and brings forth a 
diversity which we can neither evade nor master.
All these possible futures compete with one another and 
rub each other's elbows raw in the crush. Presumably the 
much-lamented disappearance of utopia has its basis in this 
relativisation of the possible. It's not because nothing oc­
curs to us any more than the available projects, irrespective 
of whether utopia or dystopia appear banal to us and no 
longer binding, but because the supply of phantasms of the 
future exhausts our power of comprehension.
Futurology is the science of tea leaves. It ascribes the pat­
terns and structures which it wants to interpret to its 
material, in order to read them from it: Mars got its canals 
like this and the moon its face. This psychedelic procedure 
can rely on a tacit correspondence with our everyday ’ 
projections. It is amusing to observe that the mathematical 
term intersects with the psychoanalytic one without any­
thing dawning on either discipline.
This future pluralism has by now become part of the inte­
rior furnishing of normality. Anyone who 'thinks more than 
one day ahead'—and which of us is spared that?—un-
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avoidably develops whole series of scenarios which are 
not only incompatible with one another, but are mutually 
exclusive. The very same person, who is convinced that a 
worldwide catastrophe is imminent, signs a 30-year life 
insurance policy without batting an eyelid. The oscillation 
between Age of Aquarius and Apocalypse, New Age and 
profit calculation, nirvana and investment consultancy be­
came a mass phenomenon long ago. It's easy to poke fun 
at the crude scenarios in which superstition is at home; but 
the future has its trends whose rise and fall, even among 
people who consider themselves to be models of reason, 
would be difficult to explain rationally. Nuclear war in 
Europe, an obsessive nightmare only a few years ago, has 
as good as disappeared from the collective imagination. 
Countless versions of ecological catastrophe are evoked in 
its place. Thus the unimaginable appears as a mere varia­
tion, the extinction of the species as interchangeable play 
material.
Even the 'visions' of catastrophe obey the realisation cycle 
of the media. Their totality is specious, the finality which 
they claim makes way for others, which emerge with just 
as much exclusivity: everything will be completely dif­
ferent, because the world economy is about to break down, 
because artificial intelligence is replacing the subject, be­
cause incurable diseases will make all other catastrophes 
superfluous, because genetic engineering will put an end 
to mankind, and so on.
But pessimism cannot be trusted either. It's not only the 
monthly mortgage interest payment which presents a 
silent but tenacious reservation. The same articulate citizen 
who is convinced of the unstoppable poisoning of the 
planet, of the melting of the polar ice caps, of the exhaus­
tion of all natural resources, simultaneously holds on to the 
ideology of the technological fix and awaits the redeeming 
invention, the rescuing serum, the gentle trick which will 
solve all the energy problems once and for all.
The incompatible also exists among the experts. The 
economists can be considered the pioneers of modern for­
tune telling. For as long as anyone can remember, they've 
been solemnly providing the economy with their horo­
scopes, completely unaffected by every refutation by 
reality. The orthodox marxist calculates the day on which 
capitalism will finally collapse; in glossy brochures the 
dubious investment consultant predicts the next stock ex­
change boom. Both find a credulous public. Their prog­
noses have only one thing in common: the unshakeable 
conviction with which they are delivered. On this point the 
Club of Rome is in agreement with the nuclear power 
lobby, just as much as the climate researchers are with the 
demographers: each has put a claim on the future, his 
future.
The addressee of these efforts is on a see-saw. The media 
subject him to a constant alternation of apocalyptic and 
tranquillising slogans, and there remains little else for him 
to do, except get used to the unstable balance of panic and 
apathy. The common sense, which believes in muddling 
through, in the long run immunises itself against the in­
structions which are concealed in both positive and nega­
tive prophecies. Anyone who looks back at the future
scenarios of the 50s, 60s and 70s will have to admit that 
common sense with all its limitations has not come off any 
worse than all the think tanks of the world.
The experiences which have pulled the rug out from under 
the philosophy of history are, therefore, very tangible ones. 
The naivety of all theories—which are ultimately only 
secularised versions of the history of salvation—has be­
come blatant even for someone who has little interest in 
speculative thought. Irrespective of whether they appear 
in 'progressive' or 'conservative' guise, their self-con­
fidence has suffered greatly, and it's easy to see that they 
are now only concerned with administering their own 
assets. It is surprising and remarkable that in fact a certain 
fraction of the 'hard' sciences have new suggestions to offer 
in this situation and, precisely because it is leaving behind 
its own tradition, the dogmatism of exact calculation. There 
have been developments in thermodynamics, evolution­
ary theory, systems theory, but also in mathematics and in 
theoretical physics that could perhaps lead out of the old 
dead ends.
They are concerned with new paradigms of self organisa­
tion, with dissipative structures and non-linear logics. One 
thing at least has become clear beyond any doubt: the 
evolution of complex systems cannot, in principle, be 
precisely predicted. Their course is decisively influenced 
by singular events, often of a very high degree of im­
probability. Minute inputs can cause very large ensembles 
to collapse while, on the other hand, enormous determin­
ing variables can be dynamically absorbed without uncon­
trollable turbulences resulting. Of course, that can also be 
expressed more simply. One could say that science is well 
on the way to reinstating chance to its old metaphysical 
rights. However, nothing would be gained by regression 
to a world of pre-scientific concepts.
More interesting is the question whether such new modes 
of thinking can also be applied to social processes. Their 
inventors have nothing to say in this respect—presumably 
not only because they don't feel themselves to be com­
petent, but also because they recoil from the ideological 
implications of such a transposition. They have no interest 
in falling victim to politics. Equally, ever since their vic­
torious polemic against Social Darwinism a hundred years 
ago, sociologists and social critics take it for granted that 
there is nothing to be learned from the natural sciences. 
This prejudice long ago hardened into a leftwing ban on 
thinking.
Yet the condition of the wealthiest contemporary societies 
suggests precisely such investigations. They have aban­
doned the idea of planning. The powerful and the weak, 
individuals and groups continue to pursue their own par­
ticular goals, but the movement of the whole evades their 
designs, and even their imaginative capacity. It would not 
occur to anyone to think up a 'Five-Year Plan' and to put it 
into action, to say nothing at all of more ambitious goals. 
The idea of proposing or prescribing development plans & 
la Rostow to others, third parties (the Third World, for 
example) has also been abandoned. With that the once-so- 
favoured conspiracy theories which saw the historical 
process as guided by secretive omniscient centres have also
ALR: SEPTEMBER 1992
FEATURES 37
been disposed of and the search for a subject of history, 
whether revolutionary or evolutionary, has proved to be 
futile.
An instance which would be capable of such central direc­
tion can no longer be discerned in these 'advanced' 
countries at all; it could even be argued that these are 
societies without leaders—that would be the ironic resur­
rection of a condition which the anthropologists believe 
they discovered among pre-historic peoples. Of course that 
is very far from meaning that power, wealth, opportunities 
would be more equally or even justly distributed in such 
an ensemble. It means only that after the dissolution of firm 
hierarchical status and class relationships an unstable, 
dynamic, fluid balance is forming, which constantly 
reproduces and changes itself without plan. Governments 
and parties in such a system have long ago ceased 'to 
determine the guidelines of politics', or even, as in the old 
physiological metaphors, to function as head, brain, central 
nervous system of the whole; they attempt, at most, to 
extend the metaphor, a kind of hormonal management, in 
order to prevent the turbulences building up into a 
catastrophe. Even this task seems too much for them 
Where they attempt to tackle the results of the unplanned 
social process frontally, they regularly fail: 'It is/ as the 
party officials then like to say, 'politically unacceptable'.
But it's not only the state whose effectiveness has declined; 
economic power too, despite, perhaps even because of its 
high degree of concentration, no longer appears, as it once 
did, monolithic and permanent. The multinational com­
panies of today are threatened to the point of bankruptcy 
by unpredictable disturbances, crises, break-downs, take­
overs, unstable patterns of ownership, sudden predatory 
raids. Just as international capital is daily moved around 
the globe in uncontrolled billion-dollar transactions, as the 
value of currencies is stochastically determined in a per­
manent electronic experiment, so economic power, too, 
embodied in a vast but fragile jellyfish, is subject to an 
unrestrained floating, a rapid sequence of rise and fall, 
growth and decay.
But in a dynamic regime that is constantly transforming 
itself there are also zones of inertia and resistance which are 
systematically underestimated by politicians and tech­
nocrats. We have seen how within the shortest space of time 
societies transform themselves right down to their seeming 
incorrigible features, right down to their collective uncon­
scious (should such a thing exist); we have, on the other 
hand, experienced how all attempts to level out their diver­
sity have failed. Limits which evade calculability are also 
placed on change. So projects to abolish bread or writing, 
for example, encounter a resistance which is difficult to 
explain but evidently tenacious; sub-systems like the so- 
called nuclear family have proved, against all expectations, 
to be extremely resistant.
This movement between acceleration and inertia, liquefac­
tion and persistence only makes the whole thing even more 
opaque. It is conceivable that such ambivalences make the 
process even more vulnerable to determining variables 
which are tiny in size, but appear at a significant moment 
and in the right place. The sudden passing of critical thresh-
holds plays an ever more important role not only in ecology 
but also in politics. Consequently an old, embarrassing 
subject, which the marxists thought had been finished off 
a long time ago, appears in a new light: the 'role of the 
individual in history'. The emergence of a Khomeini or a 
Pol Pot can cost millions of people their head; if an en­
lightened Tsar appears, the consequences are unforesee­
able; if a madman should move into the White House, then 
we wouldn't need to go on worrying our heads about the 
future of pension systems; and we don't dare to think what 
would happen if a brilliant founder of a religious sect got 
control of the media. Even someone who still enjoys put­
ting forward theses about the future must realise that every 
single one of then can at any time be upset by a minimal 
factor x, which triggers the flash point
Most of us will probably find it quite easy to put up with 
the end of the philosophy of history. But that does not mean 
that we could get by without perspectives for our lives, 
strategies, 'plans'. The result is that the scissors between 
theoretical understanding and the practice of life must 
open ever wider. If there is some truth to what I have tried 
(fairly casually) to suggest here, then there follows from 
that a behaviour which can no longer claim any general 
obligatoriness: each person is left to pursue his own con­
jectures, and even they are subject to an unspoken reserva­
tion: I act as if, among all the continuously oscillating 
futures, I could find my own.
At the risk of it being confused with a confession I would 
like to state such a conjecture. I believe the flexibility which 
is demanded and praised on all sides and which is gradual­
ly being elevated to the status of a cardinal social virtue, to 
be a bad strategy. The mere social automaton, who always 
only responds to current situations, not only loses the last 
remnant of control over his own fate, he will always also 
arrive too late. The hedgehog's contempt for the hare, who 
is always panting behind him, is certain, but the opposite 
solution is also worth less every day. Anyone who believes 
that what matters is to assault 'the system' frontally, as a 
conservative or a revolutionary warrior, succumbs—if my 
description is not mistaken—to an illusion; because such 
an attitude is only then meaningful if one disposes of an 
objectively stringent perspective for the future (knows 'the 
meaning of history').
The question whether it's best to swim with the current or 
against it seems to me out of date because it presupposes 
an untenable simplification. The method of the yachtsman 
who tacks with the wind as well as against it seems more 
fruitful. Such a procedure applied to society demands stoic 
disbelief and the greatest attentiveness. Anyone who wants 
to reach even the nearest goal must expect, step by step, a 
thousand unpredictable variables and cannot put his trust 
in any of them. But presence of mind alone is not enough. 
No one who wants to escape the idiocy of synchronicity 
can afford to be afraid of anachronism. A certain degree of 
obstinacy which renounces last proofs can do no harm.
HANS M AGNUS EN ZEN SBERG ER is a  Germ an essayist, 
and author of Europe, Europe and Political Crumbs. T h is is 
an extTact from his latest book, Mediocrity and Delusion, 
published by V eiso. Copyright Verso Books 1992.
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Theorising Pragmatism
In recent years cultural theorists have 
been encouraged to hang up their critiques 
and roll up their sleeves for more mundane 
policy concerns. But is the turn from criti­
que to policy all it's cracked up to be. 
Reviewing a new book on the subject, both 
Meaghan Morris and Gay Hawkins 
have their separate doubts.
Four years ago, Tony Bennett (the 
director of Griffith University's In­
stitute for Cultural Policy Studies) 
stirred the small world of cultural 
studies by declaring that "the 
grandstanding of the cultural critic" 
was no longer "an acceptable mode of 
intellectual work".1 He did this by is­
suing a manifesto, in vintage avant- 
garde style. As any good manifesto 
should, Bennett's "Culture: Theory 
and Policy" announced a plan of ac­
tion—and a list of proscribed ac­
tivities.
The plan was to develop cultural 
policy studies as an area where 
academics and policy professionals 
could interact. To make it work, 
academics would have to stop using 
cultural artefacts as vehicles for a 
"generalised form of social criticism", 
and start thinking about culture as "a 
set of institutionally inscribed proces­
ses". Cultural policy studies would 
therefore exclude those conservative 
and leftist forms of criticism "highly 
prone to denunciatory stances, in 
which positions are deduced from 
general principles and applied across 
different policy fields"—that is, it 
would exclude "Leonie Kramer" and 
"John Docker".
In a favourable climate of nationwide 
Labor dominance, cultural policy 
studies flourished. Critics worked 
with government, industry and com­
munity groups; the denunciatory 
'ought-to ' style of oppositional 
politics gave way to a 'can-do' ethic of 
social participation; it became accept­
able to talk about 'engineering' and 
'superintending' the culture of other
citizens; svelte and sober business at­
tire replaced the lumpy look of 1970s 
leftism; 'modesty' and 'pragmatism' 
were the slogans of the day.
But old grandstanding styles die hard. 
Under pressure to explain their posi­
tion at academic conferences, some 
promoters of cultural policy studies 
have been moving back into a full-on 
denunciatory mode. Their object? Not 
"Leonie Kramer", just "John Docker"; 
not the cultural politics that we might 
expect from a Hewson government, 
but the leftist cultural criticism of the 
past; not the failures of the can-do 
policy culture of the 1980s, but the 
general principles of cultural' critique' 
and how these ought to change. Per­
haps it's a sign that the climate is 
changing, the flows of power shifting; 
once again, the radical vanguard is 
nuking the next-door neighbours.
Stuart Cunningham's Framing Cul­
ture2. is an uneasy mixture of these two 
moments in the history of the 
proselytising wing of cultural policy 
studies. The bulk of the book is made 
up of sensible, positive and useful ac­
counts of particular policy issues, with 
tips on how textual critics could more 
effectively contribute to public debate. 
Cunningham wisely focuses on areas 
of "stubborn" controversy in broad­
casting policy—Australian content 
regulation, advertising standards, pay 
television, violence in the media. This 
makes the book more durable and 
broadly appealing than policy docu­
ments need to be, and it allows him to 
discuss the differing expectations that 
we can or should bring to 'criticism' 
and 'policy' processes. He counsels
critics to be more modest about what 
their work can achieve, and preaches 
a case-by-case practice of "piecemeal" 
reform that produces real results.
So far, so good. But the polemical 
framework of Framing Culture quite 
ignores this good advice. Cunnin­
gham is not happy to think that cul­
tural policy studies might simply be 
added to the "smorgasbord" of ap­
proaches already used in cultural 
studies. Instead, cultural policy must 
utterly transform cultural studies, and 
our very idea of what counts as 
criticism must change. Cunningham 
argues that cultural critics should start 
producing "analysis of and for 
policy". That is, we should teach 
policy and write about policy with an 
aim of helping policy; our textual 
analysis and pedagogy must be subor­
dinated to this end, and the state 
should set parameters for critical 
debate.
There is nothing modest about this 
proposal. It amounts to saying that, 
while "piecemeal reform" is the way 
to go in dealing with cultural policy, 
nothing less than a total revolution 
will suffice in cultural criticism. I am 
not sure why "piecemeal" is a positive 
term for Cunningham while "smor­
gasbord" is so negative, but I suspect 
that it has something to do with a 
return to the (Althusserian) repressed; 
insisting that cultural criticism must 
"get the settings right" is not so far 
from dreaming that it could be more 
'scientific'. In any case, Framing Cul­
ture offers something wonderfully 
contradictory—a totalising, theory- 
driven account of the need for 
'specific' and 'pragmatic' critical inter­
ventions.
It follows that Framing Culture is often 
more dogmatic than pragmatic in 
spirit For example, the chapter on ad­
vertising picks up Bennett's rejection 
of "generalised social critique" as an 
aim for cultural policy studies—and 
turns critique into a generalised sin 
which any critics, whatever their aim, 
can be "guilty" of committing. Thus, 
feminist semiotic analyses of advertis­
ing are deemed "guilty" of not using 
"content analyses based on accepted
ALR : SEPTEMBER 1992
Ar
tw
or
k:
 J
oc
k 
A
le
xa
nd
er
ALR EVIEW 39
sampling techniques"—in other 
words, of using other techniques and 
of not being written directly for cul­
tural policy workers. Since the study 
of representation now occurs 
worldwide across a vast range of 
fields from philosophy to literature to 
medicine, this is tantamount to 
demanding that all such study in 
Australia be carried out as amateur 
social science.
It's not on. However, the most curious 
feature of Framing Culture is how little 
effort goes into persuading cultural 
studies readers that something real is 
"on" in its polemic. The image of cul­
tural studies in the book is very largely 
fantasmal; it is as though the text were 
addressed to someone who already 
thought that it was a wank but wanted 
some reassurance. For example, 
sinister claims are made that cultural 
studies may actually "deskill" some 
classes of student—a serious charge 
for which no evidence is supplied. 
(There is only a reference to a British
text making similar claims but again 
supplying no evidence.)
The fantasy results partly from the 
book's argumentative structure (each 
chapter offers a parable about a critical 
text that fails a policy occasion), and 
partly from Cunningham's habit of 
attributing silly attitudes to a fictitious 
person whom he calls "the cultural 
critic"—a smug soul who despises 
policy workers and quails at words 
like "software". Since cultural studies 
in Australia has been strongly sus­
tained by critics (many of them 
feminists) with a history of engage­
ment in practical media work, it's 
hard to know just who or what these 
fictions refer to.
The basic problem is that Cunnin­
gham uses "cultural studies" as an 
all-purpose Bad Object condensing 
any vaguely leftwing analysis of cul­
ture that he disagrees with. His major 
political theme is the need to defend 
the national frameworks of cultural
regulation currently allowing 
Australian critics to do the work that 
we do. Therefore his main bugbears 
are, on the one hand, the British-in­
spired theorists of "consumer ap­
propriation" and "audience 
resistance" who, in the mid-1980s ex­
cluded political economy from cul­
tural analysis and, on the other, leftist 
attacks on nationalism that deny all 
value to the nation-state.
I share Cunningham's views on these 
issues. But the consumer movement 
was only one strand of cultural 
stud ies, and (leaving aside John Dock­
er, whose work derives from local 
libertarian sources) it was far more 
influential in Britain and the USA than 
in Australia—probably because it as­
sumed a congruence between the 
"metropolitan" popular culture it 
promoted and everyday life in a 
Northern metropolis. Many cultural 
critics (including myself) working 
elsewhere in fact objected to this, and 
so it is quite inaccurate to represent
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cultural studies as a hotbed of anti­
nationalism.
One of our binding concerns is 
precisely the problem of cultural 
'specificity' and 'difference'. This is 
why David Harvey can take the op­
posite tack to Cunningham and ac­
cuse us all, in his Condition of 
Postmodernity, of complicity with 
blood-and-fatherland nationalism. 
Beginning with the study of class, 
then gender and race as shaping for­
ces in social experience, cultural 
studies 'frames' culture as a site of 
practice where we are always forced
to negotiate material constraints—in­
cluding the nation. (Homi Bhabha's 
anthology Nation and Narration (1990) 
addresses exactly this issue).
In the last chapter, Cunningham again 
makes sensible suggestions about 
putting policy into our pedagogy. I am 
not convinced that "the cultural critic" 
is inherently in need of basic teaching 
tips (like beginning with media ar­
ticles rather than specialist journal es­
says), but still—it's good advice. 
Hopefully, these practical ideas will 
have more effect than the grandstand­
ing denunciations which Framing Cul­
ture so wildly applies across different 
critical fields.
MEAGHAN MORRIS is a full-time 
writer and sometime lecturer on 
cultural theory. Her latest book is
Ecstasy and Economics: American 
Essays for  John Forbes (Empress, 1992).
1. Tony Bennett, "Culture: Theory and 
Policy", Media Information Australia, 53 
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2. Stuart Cunningham, Framing Culture: 
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Suiting the Critics
Framing Culture is a book with a Posi­
tion—with a very large capital P. This 
is the source of its pleasure and its 
problems. After wading through so 
much postmodern writing where 
everything is unravelled and nothing 
is declared there is something very 
appealing about a book that takes a 
stand.
Put simply, Cunningham's argument 
is that cultural studies has lost its radi­
cal edge. Its claims to being a critical 
and political enterprise are becoming 
hard to sustain. Cultural studies' lan­
guage of resistance is not only idealis­
tic and abstruse, but also has little 
impact on public debates about media 
culture. The search for 'progressive' 
texts, resistant subcultures and active 
audiences is a long way from where 
the real action is. For Cunningham, 
cultural policy, that vast terrain of 
government, economics, technology 
and institutions, is the true heartland 
of the political. And this is where use­
ful cultural studies should focus its 
energies: on research which engages 
with policy and which intervenes in 
debates that structure the manage­
ment of culture.
The gulf between criticism and cul­
tural policy (a gulf marked by dif­
ferent languages, methods and 
outcomes) provides the fundamental 
opposition which underpins 
Cunningham's whole argument. 
While the cultural critique is abstract, 
disinterested and academic, according
to Framing Culture, studies of policy 
are relevant, instrumental and voca­
tional. This opposition is read as 
symptomatic of the wider context of 
the reform of Australian tertiary 
education.
In an interesting interpretation of the 
'Dawkins reforms' Cunningham 
reviews the debates about the future 
of the humanities. He argues it is no 
longer possible to rely on tired old 
defences of the humanities as a 
privileged field devoted to the 
production of well-rounded citizens 
skilled in critical reasoning. The time 
has come to establish a more produc­
tive relationship between critical ethi­
cal competencies and applied 
vocational education. These two ap­
proaches to humanities education are 
not necessarily incompatible. In fact, 
the incorporation of a policy focus into 
cultural studies could well signal 
precisely this type of renewal.
After establishing the outline of his 
argument Cunningham moves on to a 
series of case studies in cultural policy 
formation. The purpose here is not to 
offer detailed historical accounts but 
rather to explore the nature and effects 
of the gap between criticism and 
policy. The case studies selected are: 
the problems of identifying a national 
cultural policy framework in the era of 
global cultural markets; the role of ad­
vertising in national culture; the saga 
of pay TV; and violence on television. 
A recurring problem is identified in
these case studies: the tendency for 
cultural critique to operate in a 
separate domain where policy is either 
ignored or deplored from the 
standpoint of Left idealism. In opposi­
tion to this, Cunningham urges an 
engagement with the terrain of policy 
which seeks to challenge and extend it 
to more progressive ends.
One of the great values of the case 
studies is their Australian content. 
This book is militantly local; global 
economic trends and imported theory 
are interpreted from the specific focus 
of Australian conditions. In this way 
Framing Culture rejects the cringe men­
tality. It is not seduced by the rhetoric 
of the 'global cultural takeover', nor 
does it uncritically defer to British or 
American cultural studies.
For example, Cunningham's discus­
sion of violence on television is 
situated within a sophisticated criti­
que of various paradigms for inves­
tigating media 'effects'. In this way 
competing discourses and 
methodologies are assessed in terms 
of their ability for understanding and 
influencing the policy process in 
Australia and for expanding the criti­
cal focus of cultural studies. This tech­
nique makes for a dynamic analysis 
that does not demand that cultural 
studies service public agendas and re­
search, but explores the positive con­
nections that could be made between 
critique and policy.
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A second positive feature of Framing 
Culture is its relentless focus on broad­
casting. In the broad sweep of cultural 
policy the mass media are politically 
and economically dominant They are 
big industries with big audiences, ad­
ministered through the powerful 
m arket-oriented Department of 
Transport and Communications. Cun­
ningham focuses on this sector as a set 
of cultural industries; in consequence 
he is more interested in the politics of 
industry development and regulation 
than aesthetic outcomes. This also 
means that Framing Culture shifts the 
analysis of cultural policy in Australia 
way beyond the fairly limited focus 
developed in Tim Rowse's Arguing the 
Arts. In Rowse's book arts policy and 
the politics of subsidy and patronage 
were the focus. As interesting as this 
was, Cunningham's study reminds us 
of the profound marginality of the 
arts.
Yet, as someone working in the field 
of cultural policy studies I have an 
ambivalent response to this book. Of 
course it is pleasant to see your work 
getting a tick of approval as 'political­
ly correct', but I am not sure that I 
want to accept the terms on which this 
approval is granted. The central prob­
lem as I see it is that the case for cul­
tural policy studies is seriously 
overstated. Too much is dismissed or 
caricatured in the quest to establish 
the special value of policy studies and 
too many tricky political questions are 
sidestepped.
More particularly, I have a number of 
reservations about aspects of 
Cunningham's argument. The first 
concerns his representation of cultural 
studies. Framing Culture is part of a 
wider process of self-reflection within 
cultural studies, evident in the 
proliferating histories of the field and 
in the angst displayed at cultural 
studies conferences both here and 
overseas about the dilution of the radi­
cal agendas of the 70s and early 80s in 
the interests of survival and estab­
lishing credibility. Cunningham's 
foray into this process of review is 
marked by his identification of three 
dominant approaches within cultural 
studies: the 'Left humanities' position 
(including the search for progressive 
texts and resistant social practices, as 
Well as postm odernism  and 
deconstruction); the 'Right social 
sciences' position, which rejects
rhetorical Leftism and argues for em­
pirically grounded work freed from 
the constraints of ideology and grand 
theory; and a third 'centrist' policy 
position which is characterised by em­
pirical studies of public policy uncon­
strained by academic discourse and 
which have a definite progressive and 
programmatic intent. No prizes for 
guessing which position Cunnin­
gham identifies himself with.
I think this appraisal of cultural 
studies seriously misrepresents the 
field. Cunningham tries to establish 
the superiority of policy studies by 
opposing it to the idealistic Left on one 
hand and the empiricist Right on the 
other. This trivialises the complexity 
of cultural studies' critical project by 
implying that a species of revolution­
ary neo-marxism still predominates. 
'Left' cultural studies is accused of 
clinging to a "totalising and confron­
tational rhetoric" which isolates it 
from the public political arena.
A close look at any recent cultural 
studies anthology or conference pro­
gram would contradict this. If there is 
one achievement to which cultural 
studies can lay claim, it is recognition 
of the multiple axes of social dif­
ference and the plurality of critical 
practices. Gender and sexuality 
studies, post-colonialism, studies of 
popular culture and textual studies 
are a few examples of areas where the 
investigation of politics and culture 
often involves other paradigms and 
has various progressive effects. Cul­
tural critique stands for a lot more 
than Cunningham acknowledges.
Yet, Framing Culture is not just a book 
about what's wrong with cultural 
studies; it is also a book about the 
state. Cunningham avoids monolithic 
and deterministic accounts of how 
culture is administered. His case 
studies are generally attentive to the 
diversity of functions and power rela­
tions which shape public cultural in­
stitutions. His accounts of the 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal's 
role in defining 'Australian content' 
and 'media violence', for instance, 
traces how these ideas were produced 
and contested through the interplay of 
different interest groups.
Underlying this specific analysis is a 
wider argument for the renewal of so­
cial democracy and the concept of 
citizenship. Cunningham argues that
it is only through the rhetoric of 
citizenship that issues of cultural 
rights, access and equity can be raised. 
Framing Culture presents a case for the 
revitalisation and promotion of social 
democracy, especially in opposition to 
economic rationalism. But whether 
social democracy is up to the task is a 
crucial question that Cunningham 
rarely raises. Economic rationalism is 
not only teaching us to believe that we 
cannot rely on government for any­
thing but also that policies based on 
social and cultural benefits are simply 
disguises for protectionism.
Tensions between the oppositions of 
consumers versus citizens, market 
forces versus regulation and culture 
versus economics have a very distinc­
tive resonance in cultural policies. 
Framing Culture explores the effects of 
these tensions on policy processes— 
yet its social democratic 'solutions' 
sometimes seem ineffectual in the face 
of the economic forces shaping cul­
tural production and consumption. 
The emergence of the consumer 
movement, for example, is cited as 
evidence of the triumph of consumers 
as citizens demanding their right to 
accurate inform ation and safe 
products. But this is surely over­
shadowed by the might of an 
Australian advertising industry 
dominated by transnational corpora­
tions which have an ambiguous rela­
tion to national regulations, let alone 
local consumer groups.
The problem with Cunningham's 
wholesale endorsement of social 
democracy is that it excludes the pos­
sibility of imagining other futures. Al­
ternative visions of intervention and 
policy are prohibited in the interests of 
realisable reforms. One way this 
'other' space could be developed is 
through the production of more sub­
stantial research on the political 
economy of Australian cultural in­
dustries. We still know very little 
about industry structures and or­
ganisation in the cultural sector. For 
too long political economists have ig­
nored this area because of their fas­
cination with what they consider to be 
more properly productive sectors 
such as manufacturing and primary 
industries. Yet it is quite possible that 
some areas of local cultural produc­
tion and consumption could prefigure 
new economic models which achieve 
both market success and positive con­
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sumer identity and control (the Syd­
ney Lesbian and Gay Mardi Gras is an 
example).
Another problem of Framing Culture is 
its definition of the relationship be­
tween intellectual practice and politi­
cal change. Framing Culture constantly 
insists on intervention in policy as the 
correct political vocation for cultural 
studies. Cunningham berates cultural 
studies intellectuals for missing the 
opportunity of participating in dis­
cussions about policy. While they 
cling to the sanctity of disinterested 
scholarship, media industry bosses 
and conservative groups dominate 
public forums. It is impossible to dis­
agree with the general call to unlock 
the academies, yet Cunningham's 
vision of the academic as activist is 
more of a problem. The assumption is 
that the world of suits, shoulder pads, 
7 am flights to Canberra and lunch 
with the minister is the site of 'real' 
politics.
I do not think policy studies is the 
source of a more authentic and effec­
tive political practice for cultural 
studies. It involves different intellec­
tual practices and different political 
dynamics, but it is impossible to insist 
that these are superior to other forms 
of critical work. Again, Cunningham 
seems to ignore the dilemmas of ap­
plied intellectual work. In the case of 
consultancies, the lack of control over 
the research agenda, the inability to 
influence how the research is or isn't 
used, and the constraints of the 
economic obligation are not simply 
problems of academic freedom but of 
contractual relations. Nor does he pay 
enough attention to the gap between 
formal policy formulation and the 
play of power that goes on in the 
senior management meetings of 
bureaucracies or in Cabinet. My ex­
perience as a consultant and academic 
leaves me a little sceptical. I can't help 
thinking that joining the Labor Party 
or becoming a bureaucrat would be 
much more effective strategies for 
achieving specific reforms.
Framing Culture is a provocative book. 
The explorations of policy formation,
the programmatic focus and the com­
mitment to Australian content are im­
portant and valuable contributions to 
the already impressive body of cul­
tural policy studies in Australia. But 
Cunningham's dogmatic dismissal of 
cultural critique, his insistence on the 
concrete and the pragmatic as more 
properly political than other critical 
practices from teaching to textual 
studies, and his single-minded faith in 
social democracy can become infuriat­
ing. There is an almost evangelical 
subtext to the book: 'policy is the way, 
the truth and the light'. Reading it I 
imagined a more appropriate cover 
cartoon—a Jenny Coopes image. 
Three women are peering into a pram 
admiring a new baby; one comments: 
"she's got policy analyst written all 
over her".
GAY HAWKINS teaches in leisure and 
tourism studies at the University of 
Technology Sydney. (Many thanks to 
Liz Jacka for her helpful suggestions.)
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Paul John I
Paul Keating Prime Minister, by
Edna Carew (Allen and Unwin, 
1992). Reviewed by Craig Mc­
Gregor.
There he is: Prime Minister of 
A ustralia (at last), w ritten  
about, in terview ed and 
watched every day—and still an 
enigma. He is even an enigma to 
Edna Carew, despite a profes­
sionally researched and written 
biography by someone who has 
established herself as a leading 
finance writer and has the back­
ground to tackle Keating in 
precisely the arena where he ex­
cels: economic policy.
I had read Carew's earlier version of 
this book, then titled Keating: A Biog­
raphy, and enjoyed it—though I was a 
bit put off by the heavy concentration 
on Keating's financial views; it was as 
though it were a book about Keating 
the Treasurer, rather than Keating the 
Man. This new edition is essentially 
an updating of the earlier one to take 
advantage of Keating's accession to 
the prime ministership, and it has all 
the virtues and flaws of the original. 
In other words, it brings the Keating 
saga through to 1992 without really 
offering any new insights into the man 
or revising the style and tone of what 
was already a successful biography.
First, the virtues. This is an accessible 
and easily read book which follows 
Keating's career in classic chronologi­
cal order (first sentence: "Paul John 
Keating was born on 18 January 1944 
in the suburb of Bankstown...") and is 
mercifully free of economic jargon. It 
has the succinct clarity of mainstream 
feature journalism of the sort one has 
come to expect in the quality financial 
press in Australia, with lots of direct 
quotes, comments from other jour­
nalists, clips from contemporary 
newspaper reports and some useful 
scene-setting about what was happen­
ing in the politics of the nation at large 
as well as Keating's role in it.
Carew gives a good deal of emphasis, 
rightly, to Keating's working 
class/Irish/Catholic background, 
though without investigating very far 
just how much of this Keating has kept 
and how much he has discarded—a 
fascinating question, and one which, 
if she had been able to answer it, might 
have given her a more conclusive or at 
least central theme to wrestle with in 
the course of her narrative. She deals, 
briefly, with Keating's wealth, his pur­
suit of style and good taste, his 
friendships with people like property 
developer Warren Anderson ("I like 
stars"). But it is all very circumspect, 
as though she felt she had to cover the 
ground without expecting to reveal 
anything insightful about Keating's 
character.
It's left to Keating's own statements 
about his allegiances, especially in the 
later part of the book, to get across the 
commitment to his background which 
he still seems to feel so strongly—so 
much so that John Hewson accused 
him in parliament recently of "sound­
ing like Jack Lang" (not realising that 
it might have been the greatest com­
pliment he could pay his opponent). 
Carew's quick description of Jack 
Lang reads uncannily like a descrip­
tion of Keating himself:
Bom the son of a watchmaker, and 
forced to supplement the family in­
come as a child by selling 
newspapers, Lang was determined 
to shake free of working class pover­
ty. He became a successful account­
ant and a wealthy real-estate agent, 
and later a newspaper publisher. His 
entrepreneurial streak and profitable 
business interests...
Since becoming PM Keating has let 
some of that personal ideology come 
through; his old-fashioned 
Bankstown nationalism, his 
republicanism, his Irish suspicion of 
the Brits. The book brings out, too, the 
personal elan and vivacity which 
charms even hardbitten Canberra 
press gallery commentators like Alan 
Ramsey.
Carew is good at charting Keating's 
ambition, his rise from Young Labor
star to a three-week minister in the 
dying days of the Whitlam govern­
ment, to Hawke's Treasurer to, even­
tually, Prime Minister ("He's a fixer, 
he's always been a fixer"—CRA chief 
economist John McLeod). The chap­
ters on his years as Treasurer are 
detailed and illuminating, with the 
successive policy crises and changes 
documented with extracts from 
speeches, press conferences and 
newspaper columnists. There is also a 
chapter on "Old clocks and four-letter 
words" which lumps together a lot of 
human interest material about Keat­
ing, from his interest in French Empire 
antiques to his explosive verbal abuse 
to his one-eyed belief that you must be 
utterly for him or utterly against him. 
For Keating, the world is a jungle 
peopled by friends and enemies— 
nothing in between.
And yet, at the end, Keating the man 
seems as much a mystery as ever. It's 
as though Edna Carew has recounted 
the outline of Keating's character 
without ever trying to understand 
what the man is really like, what 
makes him run, what is bravura and 
what is real passion, what the hell he 
is doing it all for. This is no 
psychological portrait. There is vir­
tually no attempt at interpretation. 
Even Keating's economic policies are 
simply reported, without any attempt 
to link them with Keating's persona or 
the political/personal/ideological 
changes which may have prompted 
them. I was disappointed that Carew 
didn't even draw on her own exper­
tise to 'place' her subject in the context 
of the economic debates which have 
dominated the political agenda in 
Australia for the last decade. Keating 
is clearly not just a pragmatist, but this 
biography reads as though that's all 
he is.
So what is he? A technocrat? A moder­
niser? What's his agenda—apart from 
the most difficult one of all, winning 
the next election and keeping John 
Hewson out of office? He's certainly 
an activist, having pushed through 
the deregulation of the financial sys­
tem and a series of tax reforms which 
typically combine progressive (capital
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gains and fringe benefits) and regres­
sive (lower taxes for high income 
earners) features. He's won the ad­
miration of good, solid Left ministers 
such as Brian Howe.
Biography is a difficult art, and Edna 
Carew's is the best one of Keating we 
have. Her task has been made doubly
difficult by having someone as com­
plex and elusive as Paul John to deal 
with. She doesn't seem to have had 
much direct access to the man himself. 
What we are left with is a cautious, 
impersonal report—at a distance, as it 
were—of one of the most dazzling 
figures in contemporary Australian
politics. Whether he is as capable of 
dazzling the Australian electorate as 
he has the media we will know next 
year.
CRAIG McGREGOR's Headliners is 
published by University of 
Queensland Press.
Ole Man History
The End of History and the Last 
Man, by Francis Fukuyama (Lon­
don, 1992, Hamish Hamilton). 
Reviewed by Brett Evans.
Are we witnessing a "world­
wide liberal revolution"? Are 
we living in the "old age of 
mankind"? Indeed, has History 
with a capital 'H' really ended? 
Francis Fukuyama thinks so—  
but, in the words of Mandy 
Rice-Davies, "He would say 
that, wouldn't he".
Educated at the University of Chicago 
where one of his professors was Allan 
Bloom, author of The Closing of the 
American Mind, Fukuyama is a former 
deputy director of the US State 
Department's Policy Planning Staff, 
the intellectual powerhouse of 
American foreign policy since its es­
tablishment in 1948. He even wrote 
The End of History under the auspices 
of the RAND Corporation, a private 
enterprise equivalent of the Policy 
Planning Staff. In 1990 Fukuyama 
published 'The End of History?', the 
essay which led to this book, in The 
National Interest, an influential US neo­
conservative journal. 'The End of His­
tory?' of course, spawned an extensive 
intellectual debate throughout the 
Anglophone world.
Yet besides its tasty 'sound bite' of a 
title, how do we explain the success of 
Fukuyama's work? The End of History 
is a confused book, but it is a telling 
confusion. It captures the ambivalent 
mental state of America's conserva­
tive intelligentsia as it assesses the 
post-Cold War era. The End of History 
manages to be simultaneously trium- 
phalist and pessimistic. No mean feat,
but everyone admires a skilled 
acrobat.
If the revolutions in Eastern Europe 
and the recent break-up of the Soviet 
Empire have only been greeted with 
two cheers in the United States, it is 
because the Reagan-Bush years look 
more like the fin-de-siecle of the 
American century, and less like its 
zenith every day. In this sense 
Fukuyama's book is the first major 
neo-conservative response to Paul 
Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of Great 
Powers and the debate it spawned.
In the post-Cold War world 
geoeconomics is replacing geopolitics 
as the dominant feature of internation­
al relations. Like a champion past its 
prime, the United States seems ill- 
equipped to win this new game. The 
United States, as we are constantly 
reminded, has 'won' the Cold War, 
only to find itself losing the economic 
'peace'.
This is the dilemma of American neo­
conservatism that Fukuyama tries to 
confront. As the taste of victory turns 
to ashes in their mouths, American 
conservatives want to be reassured 
that the two great tenets of their 
faith—liberal democracy and 
economic liberalism—have fulfilled 
their Manifest Destiny. They don't 
want to hear about the problems of 
actually existing liberal 
democracy'—budget deficits, the 
need to raise taxes, the costs of im­
perial over-reach and the riots in LA. 
They want to hear about the in­
evitability of their creed's success.
This triumphalist reading of 
Fukuyama is simply stated:
As mankind approaches the end of
the millenium, the twin crises of
authoritarianism and socialist central 
planning have left only one com­
petitor standing in the ring as an 
ideology of potentially universal 
validity: liberal democracy, the 
doctrine of individual freedom and 
popular sovereignty. Two hundred 
years after they first animated the 
French and American revolutions, 
the principles of liberty and equality 
have proven not just durable but 
resurgent.
Fukuyama chooses to support this 
claim with an eccentric thesis based 
upon the works of Hegel or, more ex­
actly, upon the interpretation of Hegel 
of early 20th century French 
philosopher Alexandre Kojeve. Ac­
cording to Hegel-Kojeve-Fukuyama, 
History is one-directional, es- 
chatological and susceptible to 
Universal laws. In a throwback to the 
'modernisation' theories popular 
within American political science in 
the 1960s, The End of History argues 
that "the logic of modern natural 
science" ensures that all societies will 
eventually have access to the same 
level of technology, and hence the 
same level of economic development 
In the wake of communism's collapse, 
all nations will therefore follow the 
most efficient path to economic suc­
cess—economic liberalism.
In the book's major Hegelian twist, 
Fukuyama argues that human beings 
are driven by a "desire for recogni­
tion", what the Greeks called thymos. 
According to this view, "human 
beings seek recognition of their worth, 
or of their people, things or principles 
that they invest with worth". Thymos 
explains the urge of slaves to be free 
and consumers to spend. At the inter­
national level, thym os—or 
megalothymia, as Fukuyama
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describes it—is the driving force be­
hind war.
For Fukuyama, "recognition is the 
central problem of politics because it 
is the origin of tyranny, imperialism 
and the desire to dominate". And it 
can only ever be tamed by liberal 
democracy, the one system capable of 
satisfying this desire without self- 
destructing, because it confers upon 
each individual a sense of dignity. Fur­
ther, in a world of interlocking liberal 
democracies Kant's ideal of a per- 
tual peace would finally come into 
ing because liberal democracies do 
not go to war with each other.
Yet Fukuyama's whole enterprise 
stands on two, equally unstable sup­
ports: one theoretical, the other em­
pirical. First, his arguments are based 
on a wilful misinterpretation of 
Hegelian philosophy. As Alan Ryan 
noted recently in the New York Review 
of Books:
Anyone who has read any Hegel 
knows that Hegel did not think that 
liberal democracy was where history 
would end. Hegel thought that the 
ultimate form of political association 
was a rational legal state, but it would 
be explicitly anti-democratic, and 
liberal only in its attachment to the 
rule of law. Crucially, Hegel had no 
time for the individualism that 
Americans regard as the very heart of 
liberalism.
Instead, a traditional reading of Hegel 
would seem to predict a bright future 
for the corporatist states of North East
Asia. Maybe Fukuyama has never 
read his fellow American, Chalmers 
Johnson, on the operation of Japan's 
political economy. Johnson coined the 
phrase 'capitalist development 
model' to describe Japan and its fellow 
economic travellers—a model which 
sets economic liberalism on its head.
Fukuyama does muster the courage to 
argue, against the general thrust of his 
thesis, that the political economies of 
Asia are often authoritarian, despite 
being what he describes as "formally 
democratic". He squibs it entirely, 
though, when he explains their 
laudable economic success by singling 
out the 'Confucian work ethic' as the 
source of their dynamism.
Fukuyama has an admirable respect 
for the benefits of liberal democracy 
and a naive view of the efficacy of 
economic liberalism. For Fukuyama 
all liberal democracies must be 
capitalist economies, and all capitalist 
economies are free market economies. 
He never coherently explains the basis 
of Japan's economic success. Nor does 
he acknowledge the importance of so­
cial democratic ideas and policies in 
making the liberal democracies of the 
advanced industrial nations so stable.
In the opening stages of his book 
Fukuyama comes out swinging, but 
by its final round the champ is ex­
hausted. After proclaiming boldly for 
most of the book that he has seen the 
future and it is liberal democratic, 
towards the end Fukuyama begins to 
equivocate.
The second half of Fukuyama's title is 
lifted from Nietzsche. History has 
ended and there they are—'the last 
men': pampered, bourgeois, scions of 
a prosperous, stable liberal 
democracy, yet bored and dissatisfied. 
Much like the bond traders in Tom 
Wolfe's The Bonfire of the Vanities, ar­
gues Fukuyama:
as they sink into the soft leather of 
their BMWs, they will know some­
where in the back of their minds that 
there have been real gunslingers and 
masters in the world, who would feel 
contempt for the petty virtues re­
quired to become rich or famous in 
modern America. How long 
megalothymia will be satisfied with 
metaphorical wars and symbolic vic­
tories is an open question.
The book ends with a quaint 
metaphor. The flow of History is like 
a wagon train, Fukuyama says, strug­
gling across the Rockies towards some 
west coast nirvana. Eventually, 
"enough wagons would pull into a 
town such that any reasonable person 
looking at the situation would be 
forced to agree that there had only 
been one journey and one destina­
tion". But who can tell, he asks, 
whether the town's "occupants, 
having looked around a bit at their 
new surroundings, will not find them 
inadequate and set their eyes on a new 
and more distant journey". History 
kickstarted again by a descendant of 
John Wayne?
BRETT EVANS works for the Evatt 
Foundation.
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Alienating and Elitist
I read with great interest McKenzie 
Wark's article "The Green Old Days" 
in ALR's July issue. It put its finger 
quite precisely upon a significant 
critique of organisation-based 
politics, and on the possibilities 
opened up by information and com­
munications technologies for new 
forms of political practice. However, 
I believe that Wark's rejection of 
forms of political activity based 
around organisational structures 
could lead to a 'doughnut-like' situa­
tion in alternative politics—in other 
words, a lot at the edges, but no 
centre. In the end, this would be 
counterproductive for the process of 
achieving real political change.
The strengths of the piece were, in 
my view, threefold. First, Wark ar­
gues persuasively that it is controls 
of flows rather than territories which 
is critical in the current stage of 
capitalism. One can think of the hy­
permobility of money-capital, and 
the inability of national governments 
to control its movements effectively, 
to realise the enormous power which 
accrues to those who control these 
mechanisms. Likewise, the regimes 
in Eastern Europe, while ultimately 
brought down by the masses on the 
streets, were initially undermined by 
the capacity of a small number of 
people with access to PCs, fax 
machines and photocopiers to sub­
vert the complex webs of control,
which had been constructed to con­
tain and eliminate dissidence.
Second, it is true that attempts to 
"unite the fragments" or reconstruct 
Left politics based upon traditional 
organisational forms (parties or al­
liances) have foundered upon the in­
ability, in an era of 'media culture' 
and more complex political allegian­
ces, to build the bases from which 
even a modest form of political effec­
tiveness could occur.
Further, pyramidic structures based 
upon branch networks which link up 
to centralised power systems have 
proved widely unappealing to many 
people who are, in a more general 
sense, politically 'on the Left', and 
may well be redundant in an era 
where 'networking' can take place 
through IT systems in a much less 
time-consuming and more effective 
way. In an era where the promotion 
of pluralism, diversity and dif­
ference are the goals of a revised left, 
and where there are no simple 
answers to increasingly complex 
questions, a return to the era of 
'ideological correctness' or 'Unity 
Statement #242' is not helpful.
Third, Wark is right to say that media 
and cultural strategies have to be at 
the centre of alternative political 
strategies. In an era of increasingly 
'mediated' communication, as much 
time in any campaign should be 
devoted to accessing the means of 
communication in a professional 
way as to building the number of 
supporters on the ground. This re­
quires approaches which are media- 
literate, well targeted and 
professional in their look. No group 
has a natural constituency; alliances 
are always to be constructed, as 
much through the mass media as the 
mass meeting, and this requires a 
certain degree of media savvy in 
one's approach.
It is important to consider, however, 
what is lost if traditional political 
forms like parties are rejected. Wark 
makes clear the possibilities for com­
munications technologies to create 
new forms of how groups and in­
dividuals interact and unite. But 
what is in danger of being lost in this
discussion is the question of why 
they would, and who would initiate 
action around particular issues. One 
obvious example is the need for 
many groups to act co-operatively to 
oppose the Liberal-N ational 
Fightback! program. At present a 
campaign against Fightback! lacks an 
appropriate vehicle through which 
an alliance could be built.
Another problem is the absence of a 
political culture in the absence of 
political organisations. Strategies 
based around control over com­
munications flows, rather than per­
sonal debate and interaction, face 
two real problems. The first is that 
they necessarily exclude that large 
proportion of the population who 
are most disadvantaged, but who 
don't have access to the IT systems 
required to participate in such a 
politics.
The second is that, even for those 
who can participate in such network­
ing and exchanges, the experience is 
in many respects an individualising 
and alienating one. Further, there is 
no reason to believe that the high- 
tech hackers and networkers of 
today are any better than the ap­
paratchiks and faction convenors of 
yore; certainly they are less account­
able for their actions. Wark's 
privileging of a politics based 
around information technologies 
and speed leaves an enormous gap 
in terms of attachment to real com­
munities, localities and everyday 
life.
Wark's approach runs two risks. 
First, it strengthens the position of 
the political Right, who are not near­
ly as disorganised and who certainly 
see disorganisation as a weakness. 
Second, it runs the risk of leading 
Green and Left groups into both a 
political strategy which has no real 
connections to people's everyday 
lives, and a political practice which 
is ultim ately alienating, in­
dividualising and elitist
Terry Flew, 
School of Humanities, 
University of Technology, Sydney.
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False Impressions
In ALR's June issue Michael Easson 
made an assertion about the conse­
quences of the ADSTE-AMWU 
amalgamation which cannot go un­
answered. In the articles under the 
general heading "Is the Left Brain- 
dead?" he wrote:
Of course, we are attempting 
to answer that problem (of a 
potential Coalition Federal 
Government) by award 
restructuring, by the amal­
gamation strategy and the 
like. Yet it seems to me we 
ought to have a number of 
reservations about that 
strategy. I worry, for instance, 
that we are creating a more 
bureaucratic trade union or­
ganisation, one which won't 
be responsive to many of the 
wishes of rank and file ac­
tivists. That applies whether 
the amalgamated union is 
supposedly rightwing or 
leftwing. It will apply when 
the ADSTE merges with the 
metalworkers union and 40% 
of the ADSTE members no 
longer choose to join the 
union. It will apply when the 
Australasian Society of En­
gineers joins with the iron­
workers to form FINE (sic) 
and 30-35% of the ASE's 
members just disappear. And 
I worry that we do not debate 
many of these issues in a 
serious way within the trade 
union movement.
It is a worry that Michael Easson has 
not treated these issues seriously. He 
has also created a false and damag­
ing impression of the consequences 
of the amalgamation of the ADSTE 
and the AMWU which formed the 
Metals and Engineering Workers 
Union (MEWU). The ADSTE- 
AMWU amalgamation was success­
fully completed on 19 November
1990 and amalgamation took effect 
on 1 April 1991. One year later the 
membership had dropped, but by 
less than 6%, in the worst economic 
recession in 60 years. A close 
monitoring of the resignations 
showed that redundancies in the 
public and private sector was the 
overwhelming cause of the loss. A 
small handful of individuals cited 
the amalgamation or its perceived 
effects as a reason for resignation. 
Interestingly in the ACT and 
Western Australia the membership 
of the Technical and Supervisory 
Division actually increased because 
of local factors. These were the two 
branches of ADSTE who most ac­
tively opposed the amalgamation 
and they had predicted dire conse­
quences for our ability to recruit and 
maintain ADSTE membership.
The notion that the ADSTE-AMWU 
amalgamation has created a 
bureaucratic and unresponsive or­
ganisation is simply wrong. All the 
mechanisms for involving former 
ADSTE members in the manage­
ment of their areas of industrial in­
volvement have been maintained. 
Former ADSTE members have 
proportional representation on all 
governing bodies of MEWU. Our
commitment to delegate training 
and involvement is as strong as ever. 
The amalgamation has allowed a 
rationalisation of resources in a dif­
ficult industrial and economic 
period. It has allowed the expansion 
of a union presence in many areas 
where ADSTE had not previously 
been able to gain access.
I do not think it was Easson's inten­
tion to be malicious. His is, rather, an 
uninformed and prejudiced view of 
the union rationalisation process. 
This is a shame as Michael Easson 
holds an important position in the 
movement and he has been far more 
willing to debate issues rationally 
than many of his predecessors. In 
fact, openness of debate is the thrust 
of his contribution to the question "Is 
the Left Braindead?"
Is the NSW Labor Council secretary 
braindead? No, but he needs to talk 
more to his leftwing colleagues and 
not just about them. These issues are 
of great importance to the movement 
and the ADSTE-AMWU amalgama­
tion experience is one from which a 
number of positive lessons can be 
learned.
Brian Mason,
Acting Assistant State Secretary,
NSW,
Metals and Engineering Workers
Union.
(Through a regrettable accident, Michael 
Easson failed to receive the edited copy 
of his talk prior to going to print. Never­
theless, as he readily acknowledges, what 
was printed was what he said.—Ed.)
National Conference of the Australian Society 
for the Study of Labour History, 1993.
Invitation for Papers and Expressions of Interest 
National Conference in Labour History at Newcastle, New South Wales.
The next National Conference of the Australian Society for the Study of Labour History is to be 
held in Newcastle, NSW, industrial city and seaport.
25th and 26th of June 1993.
Please write: Bob James, c/- History Department, Newcastle University, Callaghan, NSW 2308 
or: c/- Hunter Labour History Society, 3/79 Tudor Street, Hamilton, NSW 2303
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Medal Industry
Before that lucky Spanish archer 
fired the arrow that set the Olympic 
Games ablaze a loose federation of 
local forecasting economists 
predicted that our athletes would 
come away with a bagful of medals 
including six gold. The economists 
based their forecasts on past 
evidence which showed our ath­
letes always perform better in times 
of sluggish economic growth than 
when general affluence prevails. 
Their premise was that our dollar- 
driven athletes would pull out all 
the stops to land lucrative market­
ing contracts and media exposure to 
cushion their return to a recession- 
hit homeland.
Given that most of our medal-winners 
hail from Victoria, there seems some 
credibility to their hypothesis. This 
must be music to John Hewson's ears. 
He has often regaled the media with his 
spartan upbringing and how we can all 
emulate his 'can do' spirit. Even Deng
Xiaoping got in on the act and at­
tributed the Chinese team's outstand­
ing baptism at the Olympics to the 
Chinese Communist Party agenda of 
discipline, economic reform, and stick­
ing to the socialist road. Nevertheless, 
one suspects that to Deng Xiaoping it 
did not matter whether his athletes 
wore red or blue so long as they cap­
tured the medals.
Similar sentiments prevailed in 
Australia. To our couch potatoes, win­
ning medals was not simply a matter 
of life or death—it was much more im­
portant. Even our own Iron Maiden, 
Ros Kelly, on the mother of all junkets 
attending the Olympiad, made a none- 
too-veiled threat that if our athletes did 
not measure up the funding to the 
Australian Institute of Sport would be 
cut. Paul Keating who has a quiet con­
tempt for competitive sport, immedi­
ately vetoed the sports minister's 
threat. Last year this funding 
amounted to the princely sum of $77 
million. It has not, however, escaped 
the cudgels of the Fightback! razor 
gang. Mr 'Can-do', John Hewson, who 
once ran a marathon to prove to him­
self that anything was possible if you 
turn your energy to it, expects our ath­
letes to compete on the smell of an oily 
rag (or sweaty T-shirt).
Yet funding our athletes has proved a 
remarkable example of strategic in­
vestment. Imagine in this most dire of 
times the new blow to our national 
psyche if our athletes had returned 
home empty-handed. Sure, our record 
haul of medals since 1956 won't lead to 
a medal-led economic recovery but we 
did, for a start, cream the Kiwis. 
Another plus is that Sydney's Olympic 
bid was given greater (metallic) 
weight. More seriously, the Olympics' 
world top performers on a per
capita/medal basis proved to be, yet 
again, those countries with heavy state 
funding of sport—namely the former 
and the few remaining socialist states. 
The much-maligned 'picking winners' 
approach to state interventionism does 
pay real gold, at least when it comes to 
sport. So much for level playing fields 
and leaving it to the lure of the lucre to 
bring metallic success.
In any case, the playing fields of Bar­
celona were not as level as they 
seemed. Allegations flew thick and fast 
concerning the use of performance-en­
hancing drugs by some athletes. The 
hard-to-prove drugs scam is analagous 
to the non-tariff barriers that infiltrate 
international trade. It is hard to prove 
they exist, but the repetitive trade 
surpluses give the offenders away. So, 
too, bulging biceps and powerful pec­
torals give away steroid users. Speak­
ing of bulk, Ben Johnson, silly enough 
to have got caught in Seoul, looked a 
mere shadow of himself, both literally 
and physically. In the heats for the 
100m. final he appeared to slip on a 
discarded syringe left by some incon­
siderate on the track. Marathon runner 
Lisa Ondieki was, according to her, 
well and truly handed the poisoned 
chalice. Swimmer Lisa Curry-Kenny, 
drugged on self-worship and endless 
self-promotion, failed to make the 
grade. Bang goes that third book on 
Bringing up Bozo!
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, our own 
gruesome twosome could not resist 
metal metaphors. John Dawkins 
proclaimed our new inflation rate as 
"Gold, Gold, Gold for Australia!" One 
press scribe demurred, contending that 
it was actually a silver medal perfor­
mance, since New Zealand's inflation 
rate was lower. In any case, the flag­
ging Australian economy resembled 
De Castella after his marathon—on a 
saline drip and contemplating retire­
ment. John Hewson, whose vision of 
the Olympic scoreboard resembles an 
array of economic indica tors, stirred us 
up by claiming that New Zealand had 
won the gold medal in the economic 
reform decathlon. Possibly. But if New 
Zealand is having an economic boom 
at the moment it must be the worst one 
in history.
ALEX M1LLMOW teaches in economics 
at Charles Sturt University, Riverina.
Coming up in ALR
•  The End of Radicalism?
•  Rethinking Bureaucracy
•  The Superannuation Controversy
•  The Coalition and Industrial Relations: 
Irresistable Force meets Immovable Object?
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